Impairment, Discrimination, and the Legal Construction of Disability in the European Union and the United States by Perju, Vlad F.
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
1-1-2011
Impairment, Discrimination, and the Legal
Construction of Disability in the European Union
and the United States
Vlad F. Perju
Boston College Law School, perju@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the
Social Welfare Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vlad F. Perju. "Impairment, Discrimination, and the Legal Construction of Disability in the European Union and the United States."
Cornell International Law Journal 44, (2011): 279-348.
PERJU FORMATTED 5/16/20115/16/11 1:58 PM10:37 AM 
 
44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 101 (2011) 
IMPAIRMENT, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF DISABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  
Vlad Perju† 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 102 
 I. From the Body to the Body Politic: The Transformation of 
Disability Law in the United States and the European Union .. 109 
A. Politics of the Body Disabled: The Medicalized Model in 
the European Community (1970s to 1996) ............................. 110 
B. Discovering the Body Politic: The Antidiscrimination 
Model in the United States ...................................................... 114 
C. Trans-Systemic Influences: The Migration of the 
Antidiscrimination Model from the United States to 
Europe ..................................................................................... 120 
D. Disability Rights: The Social Model in Europe (after 1996) ... 123 
 II. What’s in a Name?  Judges and the Definition of Disability ..... 128 
A. The Definition of Disability in EU Law .................................. 128 
B. The Definition of Disability in American Law ....................... 133 
 III. Explaining the Resilence of the Medicialized Model in 
Judicial Definitions of Disability .................................................. 139 
A. Endogenous Explanations ....................................................... 140 
1. Doctrinal Explanations: The Illusion of Retrospective 
Determinism ...................................................................... 140 
2. Methods of Interpretation: Textualism .............................. 142 
3. Jurisprudential Explanations: Equality‟s Path-
Dependency ....................................................................... 145 
B. Exogenous Explanations ......................................................... 150 
1. Ideological Explanations: The Market and the Social 
as a Political Double Helix ............................................... 151 
2. Sociological Explanations: The Vagaries of 
Professional Judgment ...................................................... 155 
3. Institutional Explanations: In Search of Systemic 
Equilibrium ................................................................. 157156 
 IV. Impairment, Discrimination and the Legal Construction of 
Disability ........................................................................................ 158 
A. Conceptual Forensics: Medical Impairments .................... 160159 
 
 † Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School.  This Article was written while 
I was a Global Research Fellow in the Hauser Program at NYU Law School.  I thank 
Gráinne de Búrca, Daniela Caruso, Dean Hashimoto, Mattias Kumm, Hengameh Saberi, 
Richard Steward and Lisa Waddington for comments and suggestions.  I thank Catja 
Carrell, Brittany Mosman and Elisabeth Reitano for excellent research assistance.  I also 
gratefully acknowledge a summer research grant from the Boston College Law School 
Fund.  
PERJU FORMATTED 5/16/20115/16/11  1:58 PM10:37 AM 
102 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 44 
B. The Disability Rights Movement and the Role of the 
Judiciary .................................................................................. 165 
Conclusion ................................................................................................. 170 
Introduction 
The 2008 amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
have renewed public attention to the plight of persons with disabilities.  
Almost two decades after the enactment of the ADA, Congress sought to 
undo the damage that court-imposed ―demanding standard[s] for qualifying 
as disabled‖1 had inflicted on the struggle for recognition of persons with 
disabilities.  Directing judges to construe ―the definition of disability in 
favor of broad coverage of individuals,‖2 legislators dismissed the 
judiciary‘s interpretation of disability as an individual‘s functional 
incapacity that results from a medical impairment.  That focus on the nature 
of medical impairments, rather than on their social effects, had contradicted 
the conception of disability as caused by social discrimination, not illness.3  
For instance, according to that conception, inability to walk is not a 
disability; what makes it a disability is the lack of wheelchair-accessible 
buildings.  The 2008 ADA Amendments Act4 assumes that changing the 
statutory interpretation of the definition of disability, while leaving the 
definition intact, will be sufficient to restore the ADA‘s original promise of 
social opportunity and recognition for the 50 million disabled Americans. 
The promise of empowerment and dignity has been resonating around 
the world.  We currently find ourselves at a critical point when domestic and 
international efforts are converging in a unique moment in the struggle for 
equality of persons with disabilities.5  The landmark United Nations 
 
 1. Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 †2002). 
 2. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (1990) (amended 
2008). 
 3. See Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 214 (2000) [hereinafter Scotch, Models] (―For 
over a hundred years, disability has been defined in predominantly medical terms as a 
chronic functional incapacity whose consequence was functional limitations assumed to 
result from physical or mental impairment.‖). 
 4. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).  The ADA definition of 
disability remains basically the same as the definition in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
which defined a person with a disability as ―any person who (i) [h]as a physical or 
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person‘s major life 
activities, (ii) [h]as a record of such an impairment, or (iii) [i]s regarded as having such 
an impairment.‖ 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (2005). However, the ADAAA introduces a 
distinction in the remedies available for persons who qualify as disabled under the 
different prongs of the definition by eliminating the requirement for reasonable 
accommodation for plaintiffs ―regarded as‖ disabled. See ADAAA, sec. 6(a)(1), § 501 
(h). For a discussion, see Stephen F. Befort, Let‟s Try This Again: The ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008 Attempts to Reinvigorate the “Regarded As” Prong of the Statutory 
Definition of Disability, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 993. 
 5. See Arlene S. Kanter, The Globalization of Disability Rights Law, 30 SYRACUSE 
J. INT‘L L. & COM. 241, 242 (2003) (―At no time in history has the confluence of 
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Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities6 speaks to the life 
opportunities of 650 million persons with disabilities worldwide.7  The 
Convention, which came into force in May 2008,8 has been hailed as ―the 
highest legal manifestation and confirmation of the social model of 
disability on the international stage.‖9  This international document has been 
negotiated amid a process of reform at national and supranational levels, 
which has been largely inspired by the social model.  Theorized initially in 
the United Kingdom as a reaction to the ―tyranny of paternalism‖10 that 
characterized the charity approach to disability,11 the social model gained 
political expression in the United States in the antidiscrimination paradigm 
of the ADA and subsequently spread around the world by way of 
 
domestic and international efforts challenged lawmakers, scholars, and activists to work 
together for the creation of binding international, regional, and domestic laws to protect 
the basic human right of people with disabilities to dignity and equality.‖). 
 6. U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Optional 
Protocol, Dec. 13, 2006, U.N. DOC. A/61/611 (May 3, 2008). 
 7. See U.N. Comm. for Social Development, Mainstreaming Disability in the 
Development Agenda, ¶ 2, U.N. DOC. E/CN.5/2008/6 (Feb. 2008). 
 8. G.A. Res. 63/192, ¶ 2, U.N. DOC. A/RES/63/192 (Feb. 24, 2009).  Both the 
European Community and the U.S. have become signatories to the Convention, on July 
30, 2009, and March 30, 2007, respectively.  For a study of the EU‘s role in the 
negotiations, see Gráinne de Búrca, The EU in the Negotiation of the UN Disability 
Convention, 35 EUR. L. REV. 174 (2010).  Some of the Member States of the EU have 
already ratified the Convention.  As of August 2010, there were 146 signatories to the 
Convention (89 of which also signed the Optional Protocol), of which 90 had ratified the 
Convention (including 56 ratifications of the Protocol).  Updates are available at 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/countries.asp?navid=12&pid=166.  For a study of the 
Convention, see MICHAEL STEIN AND GERARD QUINN, THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (forthcoming, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). See also Janet E. Lord, David Suozzi & Allyn L. Taylor,  
Lessons from the Experience of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities: Addressing the Democratic Deficit in Global Health Governance, 38 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 564 (2010).   
 9. Lisa Waddington, A New Era in Human Rights Protection in the European 
Community: The Implications (of) the United Nations‟ Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities for the European Community 3, (Maastricht Faculty of Law 
Working Papers Series, Paper No. 4, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1026581.  See also Michael Ashley 
Stein, Future Prospects for the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: 
EUROPEAN AND SCANDINAVIAN PERSPECTIVES 17 (Gerard Quinn & Oddny Mjoll 
Arnardottir eds., 2009) (discussing the Convention as the first legally enforceable UN 
instrument specifically directed at persons with disabilities). 
 10. See James F. Childress, Ensuring Care, Respect, and Fairness for the Elderly, 
14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 27, 31 (1984). (―Paternalism motivated by individual or 
communal benevolence, but unlimited and unconstrained by respect for autonomy, 
becomes tyrannical . . . .‖); Gareth H. Williams, Disablement and the Ideological Crisis 
in Health Care, 32 SOC. SCI. MED. 517, 520 (1991).  
 11. See DORIS ZAMES FLEISCHER AND FRIEDA ZAMES, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT: FROM CHARITY TO CONFRONTATION 7–10 (2001) (describing the charity 
approach); MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
19–26 (1996) [hereinafter OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING].  One of the early social model 
theorists is SAAD NAGI, DISABILITY AND REHABILITATION: LEGAL, CLINICAL, AND SELF-
CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENT (1969).  
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transnational social movements to more than forty legal systems,12 including 
the European Union (the ―EU‖).13  
Approaching disability reform within this larger comparative 
framework helps to understand its successes and failures across 
jurisdictions.  This Article compares disability reform in the US and the EU, 
specifically the resilience of narrow, medicalized approaches to disability in 
judicial interpretations in both jurisdictions.  The scholarly debate about the 
―judicial backlash‖14 in the US assumes that this phenomenon is unique to 
ADA litigation.  Yet a similar narrow judicial definition of disability can be 
found at the EU level.  The question thus arises whether these two 
phenomena are in any way related.  While one is always well advised to 
resist simplistic causality claims, especially in an area as complex as 
disability reform, I argue that an inquiry into the genealogy of the narrow 
judicial interpretations of the definition of disability shifts the focus to the 
social model itself.  These narrow interpretations of disability represent, at 
least in part, judges‘ reactions to how the normative framework of the social 
model conceptualizes the relations between illness, impairment, and 
discrimination.  
The concept of medical impairments is especially important in this 
context.  Despite their centrality in the legal construction of disability, 
medical impairments have remained largely under-theorized within the 
social model.  I suggest that the explanation has to do less with the concept 
itself than with the argumentative strategy deployed by the advocates of the 
model.  Important here is the attempt of the disability rights movement to 
de-link disability from illness as a precondition for building a strong, shared 
common political consciousness.15  Analogies between impairments and 
 
 12. For an analysis of the ADA‘s worldwide influence as a regulatory model, see 
generally Theresia Degener & Gerard Quinn, A Survey of International, Comparative 
and Regional Disability Law Reform, in DISABILITY RIGHTS AND POLICY: 
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Mary Lou Breslin & Silvia Yee eds., 
2002).  See also Gerald Quinn, Closing: Next Steps – Towards a United Nations Treaty 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in DISABILITY RIGHTS 519 (Peter Blanck ed., 
2005).  In the EU, the turning point was the Communication from the Commission on 
Equal Opportunities for people with disabilities: A European Action Plan, at 4, COM 
(2003) 650 final (Oct. 30, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 European Action Plan] (arguing for ―a 
new approach to disability: from seeing people with disabilities as the passive recipients 
of compensation, society has come to recognize their legitimate demands for equal rights 
and to realize that participation relates directly to insertion.‖).  The legal framework is 
now provided by the Directive Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in 
Employment and Occupation.  See Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16. 
 13. Regarding terminology, I use ―European Community‖ to refer to events or 
reforms prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, except when reference to the 
―European Union‖ is doctrinally warranted under the relevant Treaty provisions then in 
effect.  I use ―European Union‖ to refer to the present and future legal framework and/or 
policies.  
 14. See generally BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY 
RIGHTS (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003). 
 15. See Richard K. Scotch, Disability as a Basis for a Social Movement: Advocacy 
and the Politics of Definition, 44 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 159, 163 (1988) [hereinafter Scotch, 
Social Movement] (―‗[D]isability‘ as a unifying concept that includes people with a wide 
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illness were perceived as legitimizing medical expertise and thus 
perpetuating socially disabling assumptions about the standard of 
―normality.‖16  However, the de-linking distorted the translation of the 
insights of the social model into public policy and legal claims in both 
jurisdictions studied here.  The lack of a theory of medical impairments had 
the effect of alienating judges who needed guidance on how to interpret and 
apply disability statutes.  Without sufficient help in the uncharted waters of 
the discrimination-centered social model, judges (re)turned to a familiar 
approach—the medicalized conception of impairments—that allowed them 
to craft manageable standards and filter out what they perceived as abusive 
claims.  The resilience of the medicalized approaches to disability in judicial 
interpretations, as a common phenomenon in the US and the EU, is partly 
the consequence of a convergence in the reaction of courts faced with 
institutional and administrability concerns and the strategy of the social 
model to unify the base of the disability rights movement.  I offer this as an 
explanation, not a justification, of the judiciary‘s narrow interpretations.  
The shift from explanatory to normative approaches rests on theories of the 
judicial role that are themselves open to dispute.  According to one such 
theory, which I endorse, the judiciary‘s narrow interpretations represent a 
failure to respond appropriately to the claims to recognition of persons with 
disabilities. 
Implied in the claim presented in this Article is the importance of one 
idea—the social model—in the comparative study of disability regulation in 
Europe and the United States.  While other scholars have shown that 
conflicting legal strategies in the struggle for equality of persons with 
disabilities are rooted in contradictions of the disability rights movement,17 
 
range of physical and mental impairments is by no means an obvious category.  Blind 
people, people with orthopedic impairments, and people with epilepsy may not 
inherently see themselves or be seen by others as occupying common ground.  Even 
greater divisions may exist between people with physical impairments and those with 
mental disabilities.  Thus another prerequisite for collective action may be the social 
construction and promulgation of an inclusive definition of disability.‖)  This explains in 
part the different tracks of the struggle for recognition and/or action/inaction of persons 
with disabilities.  See, e.g., Daniela Caruso, Autism in the US: Social Movement and 
Legal Change, 36 AM. J. L & MED. 483 (2010).  There are difficulties inherent in the 
effort of defining disability.  See Thomas F. Burke, The European Union and the 
Diffusion of Disability Rights, in TRANSATLANTIC POLICYMAKING IN AN AGE OF 
AUSTERITY: DIVERSITY AND DRIFT 162 (Martin Levin & Martin Shapiro eds., 2004) 
(arguing that ―there are as many definitions of disability as there are disabilities‖).  The 
Supreme Court of Canada recognized the same point in Eaton v. Brant County Board of 
Education (1997) 1 SCR 241 at 5 (―Disability, as a prohibited ground, differs from other 
enumerated grounds such as race or sex because there is no individual variation with 
respect to these grounds.  Disability means vastly different things, however, depending 
upon the individual and the context.‖)  In the EU context, see the decision of the 
European Court of Justice in Case C-13/05, Chacon Navas v Eurest Colectividades, 2006 
E.C.R. I-6467.  For detailed discussion, see infra Section 2.1.   
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 308–318. 
 17. Recent disability law scholarship that discusses the social model rarely questions 
its central tenets.  See Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability?, 
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2007) (arguing that the social model by itself provides 
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this Article traces the conflict one important step further, in the direction of 
the social model itself.  At the core of the model, one finds both a 
transformative insight and its central shortcoming.  The insight is that the 
cause of disability is not a medical impairment but society‘s reaction to that 
impairment.  Over the past four decades, this insight has formed the basis of 
disability reforms and changed the status of persons with disabilities from 
passive ―objects of rehabilitation and cure‖18 to rights holders entitled to 
make demands on social institutions.  The shortcoming, as we have seen, is 
the readiness to gloss over medical impairments altogether, and in this 
process, to generate distortion effects that courts have been unwilling or 
unable to rectify.  
The Article is divided into four Parts.  Part I uses the framework of 
social systems theory as a heuristic device to study how the social model of 
disability traveled back and forth between the United States and the 
supranational level in Europe.19  According to this theory, social systems are 
structurally autonomous systems.  Like cells, these systems translate into 
their unique ―code‖ the information they receive from the outside 
environment.  The social model traveled from the UK to the U.S. where, 
under the influence of a rights-centered legal and political discourse, it was 
translated into antidiscrimination ―code‖ in Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and, later, in the 1990 Americans with 
Disabilities Act.20  Transnational social movements, which had been largely 
 
insufficient guidance for social policies for persons with disabilities); Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Rights, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2004) [hereinafter 
Bagenstos, Disability Rights] (arguing that the antidiscrimination model is insufficient 
and that the solution to problems of persons with disabilities requires ―more than simply 
mandating that individual employers cease discriminating and provide accommodations; 
they require direct and sustained government interventions such as the public funding 
and provision of benefits.  In short, the future of disability law lies as much in social 
welfare law as in antidiscrimination law.‖); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-
Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476, 501 (2000) [hereinafter Krieger, 
Afterword] (―few people outside of [a] relatively small circle, including federal judges 
empowered to interpret the ADA, understand the social model of disability or adhere to 
the norms, values, and interpretative perspectives it was designed to advance.‖).  But see 
David A. Weisbach, Toward a New Approach to Disability Law, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
47, 64–71 (critically discussing some tenets of the social model).  
 18. Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability. Under Federal Anti-Discrimination 
Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 91, 94 (2000).  
 19. My use of social systems theory is heuristic in the sense of assuming elements 
that are not supported by the theory as formulated in its canonical statements. See, e.g., 
NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM (2004); NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL 
SYSTEMS (1995); Gunther Teubner, David Schiff & Richard Nobles, The Autonomy of 
Law: Introduction to Legal Autopoiesis, in JURISPRUDENCE (David Schiff & Richard 
Nobles eds., 2003).  For instance, my analogy assumes without more that legal systems 
are social systems and that the ―code‖ of a system can change over time without 
endangering the autonomy of the given social system. 
 20. See Anne Waldschmidt, Disability Policy of the European Union: The 
Supranational Level, 3 EUR. J. OF DISABILITY RES.  8, 16–18 (2009) (discussing 
alternative ways of periodization of disability rights in the EU).   
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unsuccessful at the national level in Europe,21 resorted to the American 
rights-centered version of the social model as inspiration for legislation at 
the Community level.22  This influence took the form of specific legal 
transplants, such as the duty of employers to provide reasonable 
accommodation to persons with disabilities, as well as a larger 
antidiscrimination approach to justiciable rights.  However, the European 
system‘s ―code‖ required that, in the course of implementing the model, 
rights be supplemented with broader welfare and social policies for 
―mainstreaming‖23 persons with disabilities in social life.  The more holistic 
approach that European regulations have taken in recent years is now  
generating a new round of cross-systemic influence.24  It has recently 
become a source of inspiration for American scholars and activists who 
argue that the U.S. should move beyond disability civil rights.25  This Part 
shows how successive acculturations in different political and legal cultures 
added new layers of meaning to the social model of disability but did not 
alter its core conception of illness, impairment, and discrimination.  This 
conclusion is noteworthy also from the perspective of methodological 
debates in comparative law.  Legal ideas do not dissolve in the larger 
cultural, institutional or ideological context when they migrate across 
different systems.  Comparative legal studies should combine the 
 
 21. At the time, only three national systems – the UK, Ireland, and Sweden – had 
laws protecting from discrimination on grounds of disability.  See infra text 
accompanying note 124.  
 22. See Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16. 
 23. Language also has its own code. See Commission Staff Working Paper: 
Disability Mainstreaming in the European Employment Strategy, at 3, COM (2005) 
EMCO/11/290605 (Jul. 1, 2005) (stating that ―[m]ainstreaming means that the needs of 
disadvantaged people need to be taken into account in the design of all policies and 
measures, and that action for disadvantaged people is not limited to those policies and 
measures which are specifically addressing their needs.‖).  
 24. American scholars and activists have expressed the kind of dissatisfaction with 
the American rights-centered model that European social model regulations would be 
used for inspiration.  See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE 
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 136 (2009) (arguing that ―disability rights activists must 
move beyond antidiscrimination law to embrace social welfare interventions if they are 
to achieve the goals of employment and integration into community life‖).  For a recent 
description of the comprehensive EU disability policy, see Commission Communication: 
European Disability Strategy 2010-2020, at 5–10, COM (2010) 636 final (Nov. 15, 
2010) [hereinafter 2010 EC Disability Strategy] (identifying the following areas of 
action: accessibility, participation, equality, employment, education and training, social 
protection, health, and external action). 
 25. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein and Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil 
Rights, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1205 (2007) (advocating a disability human rights 
paradigm that combines ADA-type civil and political rights with ―the full spectrum‖ of 
social, cultural, and economic measures); Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, 
and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 23 (2000) (arguing that 
―[a]lthough there are many advantages to framing the issue as a matter of civil rights, in 
some ways the civil rights model is not an ideal fit with the problems posed by the issue 
of disability.‖).  For a general comparative analysis between Europe and the US on 
general antidiscrimination regimes, see generally Katerina Linos, Path Dependence in 
Discrimination Law: Employment Cases in the United States and the European Union, 
35 YALE J. INT‘L L. 115 (2010).  
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normativity of legal projects and ideas and the richness and diversity of their 
broader social, historical and cultural contexts.26  
The genealogy and migration pattern of the social model illuminate  
otherwise puzzling similarities between narrow judicial definitions of 
disability across the two jurisdictions studied here.  Part II identifies these 
similarities.  Although scholars have amply documented the decisions of 
American courts,27 those of other courts have received less emphasis.  When 
asked to define disability, in the context whether illness was covered under 
the European directive governing disability discrimination, the European 
Court of Justice (the EU‘s apical judicial body28) answered that it was not 
and then supplied a narrow, medicalized definition of disability as ―a 
limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or psychological 
impairments and which hinders the participation of the person concerned in 
professional life.‖29  This article examines solely the ECJ, but there is 
evidence to support its conclusions in other jurisdictions, such as the UK30 
and Germany.31  Despite different background conceptions about rights, the 
state, and the proper institutional role of courts, one can find narrow judicial 
 
 26. For a learned argument that comparative law should overcome that uneasiness, 
see James Whitman, The Neo-Romantic Turn, in  COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: 
TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 312, 343–344 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 
2003).  For a recent argument about the transformation of legal culture(s) within the 
European Union in the direction of adversarial legalism, as a consequence of European 
integration, see R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW 
AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011). 
 27. One study of ADA cases found that employer-defendants won in 92 percent of 
all cases brought during the 1990s.  See Am. Bar Ass‘n, Study Finds Employers Win 
Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 403 (1998).  The Supreme Court has decided five cases 
addressing the definition of disability: Bragdon v. Abbott 24 U.S. 624 (1998), Sutton v. 
United Air Lines 527 U.S. 471 (1999) ; Murphy v. United Parcel Service 527 U.S. 516 
(1999); Albertson, Inc. v. Kirkingburg 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).  For discussion, see 
infra Section 1.2. 
 28. A note is in order regarding terminology.  As of the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the European Court of Justice has been officially renamed the ―Court 
of Justice.‖  In this comparative study, I will continue to refer to the Court by its 
traditional name of the European Court of Justice.  
 29. Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 43.  
 30. In the UK, one study found that one of the statistically significant influences on 
the chances of a plaintiff prevailing was the nature of the disability. ―[A]pplicants with 
physical or mobility problems were least likely to succeed, and those with sensory 
impairments or internal organ problems most likely to.‖ DEPARTMENT FOR EDUCATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT, REPORT, MONITORING THE DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ACT 1995 126 
(1999).  For a recent example, see London Borough of Lewisham v. Malcom [2008] 
UKHL 43 (appeal taken from Eng.).  The case is discussed in Rachel Horton, The End of 
Disability-Related Discrimination in Employment?, 37 INDUS. L.J. 376 (2008). 
 31. See generally Katharina C. Heyer, The ADA on the Road: Disability Rights in 
Germany, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 723 (2002).  As always in comparative analysis, one 
must proceed with caution.  For a nuanced and normatively rich approach to comparative 
analysis, with particular focus on labor law, see Thomas C. Kohler, The Disintegration 
of Labor Law: Some Notes for a Comparative Study of a Legal Transformation, 73 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1311 (1998). 
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interpretations of disability in disability discrimination across jurisdictions.  
Why are courts prone to remaining tied to the medicalized understanding of 
disability, despite the legislative shift towards the social model? 
Part III finds explanations first articulated in the American context and 
tests them in the European mirror.  I divide the explanations into two 
categories: explanations endogenous and exogenous to legal reasoning.  The 
former category includes doctrinal accounts that point to the courts‘ 
textualist methodology, and finally, jurisprudential explanations that place 
disability discrimination within the larger context of the jurisprudence of 
equality.  Explanations in the latter category trace the resilience of the 
medicalized approach to ideological factors (the role of both the market and 
social factors in the discourse of disability reform), sociological factors (the 
composition of the judiciary), and/or institutional factors (both inter-
institutional, between the legislature and the judiciary, as well as intra-
institutional, within the judiciary).  This Part concludes that these factors are 
insufficient to explain the staying power of the medicalized approach in the 
judicial definitions of disability. 
Part IV finds the missing explanation in the social model itself, 
specifically in constitutive tensions at the core of the social model.  The 
social model has been a variable largely absent from studies of the ―judicial 
backlash,‖32  But a comparative approach brings it back to the forefront.  
Identifying the social model itself as the missing explanation for the staying 
power of the medicalized approach to disability has mixed implications.  
The good news is that, formally speaking, changes in the judicial definition 
of disability would go a long way to change the current disability law 
regime.  Defining disability without reference to medical impairments 
would bring courts closer to a discrimination-centered approach to 
disability.33  The bad news is that an impairment-free definition is highly 
unlikely.  There is a path dependency in how concepts are defined, and 
medical impairments have so often been at the center of the meaning of 
disability such that it might be difficult to shift course radically at this stage.  
However one envisions the future of disability law, it helps to understand 
the judicial definition of disability as reflecting deep tensions in the 
arguments and argumentative strategies in support of the social model.  This 
last Part concludes with recommendations de lege ferenda.  
I. From the Body to the Body Politic: The Transformation of 
Disability Law in the United States and the European Union 
My main aim in this Part is to present a comparative history of 
 
 32. See generally Krieger, supra note 14. 
 33. Even the boldest proposals for amending the ADA, which sought a formal 
change in the statutory provisions on the meaning of disability, would have defined 
disability by reference to ―actual, past or perceived physical or mental impairment.‖  
National Council of Independent Living, Major Progress on ADA Restoration: A 
Potential Deal with the Business Community, 
http://www.ncil.org/news/ADARADeal2.html. 
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disability law in the United States and the European Union over the past 
four decades.  While following different paths, the evolution of the 
disability regimes in these two jurisdictions has also been synchronized.  
This synchronization is the result of the social model of disability, whose 
proponents theorized the need for reform and provided the necessary 
normative framework.  The model was first fully theorized in the United 
Kingdom and reached political influence in the United States with the 
enactment in 1990 of the ADA, which in turn inspired transnational social 
movements to lobby for changes in disability legislation in Europe.  
Social systems theory is useful, at least partly, as a descriptive 
framework for how the social model traveled back and forth between the 
United States and Europe.  According to that theory, social systems are 
structurally autonomous systems that translate into their unique codes the 
information they receive from the environment.34  This Part analogizes legal 
systems with social systems and conceptualizes the social model of 
disability as the normative message that travels back and forth across the 
Atlantic.  At the first stage, the rights-centered American legal discourse 
translates the basic insights of the social model into antidiscrimination 
―code.‖  The model then enters European supranational institutions and 
discourse, which place antidiscrimination rights within a larger, more 
comprehensive framework of welfare and social policies that represents 
Europe‘s own ―code.‖  Dissatisfied with the results of the antidiscrimination 
model, American disability scholars and advocates have recently started 
looking towards the European expression of the social model.  
A. Politics of the Body Disabled: The Medicalized Model in the European 
Community (1970s to 1996)  
The founding treaty of the European Economic Community, signed in 
Rome in 1957, envisioned the creation of an internal market among its 
signatories.35  The subject matter of the Rome Treaty closely matched its 
goals.  The treaty established mutual duties on the part of Member States to 
lift trade barriers and free the circulation of goods, services, persons, and 
capital.36  Over the next half century, the internal market expanded 
dramatically both in size, from six to twenty-seven Member States, as well 
as in institutional complexity.37  These developments called for periodic 
 
 34. As mentioned in the introduction, my use of social systems theory is heuristic. 
See supra text accompanying note 19.   
 35. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11, art. 2 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].  The European Economic Community 
postdated the creation of a more specialized European Coal and Steel Community.  See 
The Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 
U.N.T.S. 140. 
 36. Treaty of Rome, supra note 35, arts. 28–30, 39(1).  
 37. From six initial signatories (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg), membership in the Union grew to 27 states. For a study of the early 
development of the Community‘s institutional framework, see J. H. H. Weiler, The 
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).   
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revisions of the founding treaty.38  In addition to the necessary institutional 
reforms, revisions significantly expanded the Community‘s competencies 
vis-à-vis Member States.  New areas of supranational competence included 
environmental protection, employment, telecommunications, monetary 
policy, human rights, justice affairs, and other areas.39  All along, however, 
the Community remained one of limited and enumerated powers.  Member 
States remained sovereign over subject-matter jurisdictions (such as 
defense, foreign affairs, and health and social policy) that they had neither 
implicitly nor explicitly transferred to the Community.40  It was not until 
1999, when the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force, that the Community 
acquired the legal basis to pass binding measures regarding the treatment of 
persons with disabilities across its territory.41 
Lack of formal competencies does not mean that the Community had 
no initiatives in this area before the very end of the 20
th
 century.  Indeed, for 
two decades after the mid-‘70s, the Community had put forth disability 
policies under the legal framework in place at the time.  The earliest policy 
documents show the Community‘s concern to mitigate the social effects of 
medical impairments on persons with disabilities by carving out for them 
separate, parallel social tracks.42  For instance, in the employment context, 
the policy aimed at their ―rehabilitation into vocational life or, where 
 
 38. For an introductory discussion of the constitutive treaties from The Treaty of 
Rome (1957) to The Treaty of Nice (2001), see DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN 
UNION LAW: TEXTS AND MATERIALS 8–43 (2006).  The most recent rearrangement of the 
Union‘s institutional structure occurred when the Treaty of Lisbon came into effect in 
December 2009.  For a brief overview of its provisions, see Paul Craig, The Treaty of 
Lisbon: Process, Architecture and Substance, 33 EUROPEAN L. REV. 137, 137–166 
(2008).  
 39. See CHALMERS, supra note 38, at 12. 
 40. See id. at 11.  Despite the Community‘s numerous transgressions of its limited 
competency, the first time the European Court of Justice invalidated a Community act as 
ultra vires was Directive 1998/43/EC (banning most forms of tobacco advertisement 
across the Community).  See Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2000 
E.C.R. 1-8419.  For an analysis of the subsequent tobacco litigation, see Fernanda Nicola 
& Fabio Marchetti, Constitutionalizing Tobacco: The Ambivalence of European 
Federalism, 46 HARVARD INT‘L L.J. 507 (2005). 
 41. See Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, art. 13, 1997 O.J. (C340) 1. (―Without 
prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the powers 
conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take 
appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.‖). 
 42. See e.g., Council Resolution Concerning a Social Action Program (EC) No. 
12/02/1974 of 21 January 1974, art. 7, 1974 O.J. (C 013).  The separate parallel track 
that provides income and services apart from institutions that serve the non-disabled 
majority characterizes the approach of the social welfare model of disability.  See Lisa 
Waddington and Matthew Diller, Tensions and Coherence in Disability Policy: The 
Uneasy Relationship Between Social Welfare and Civil Rights Models of Disability in 
American, European and International Employment Law, in DISABILITY RIGHTS AND 
POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 244 (Mary Lou Breslin & Silvia 
Yee eds., 2002). 
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appropriate, by placing them in sheltered industries.‖43  Such policies of 
segregation assumed the existence of an unbridgeable gap between the 
social capabilities of disabled persons and those of a (non-disabled) 
majority.  Persons with disabilities were perceived as being in need of 
―rehabilitation,‖ though not necessarily entitled to it.44  By imposing itself 
on both social groups at the national level, the scheme created and 
reinforced specific (self-) understandings of social groups: one formed by 
the passive beneficiaries of ―rehabilitation‖ policies and the other by 
charitable, ―abled‖ citizens.  This social scheme constituting the foundations 
of the medical model of disability bred an inevitable—and unmistakable—
paternalism that informed the policies of national governments, which 
remained during this period the exclusive agents of rehabilitative action.45  
Expressions of paternalism also found their way in the Community‘s early 
policies and sometimes even into official documents.46
 
Lacking the legal basis for the enactment of binding laws, the 
Community acted at the early stage through soft law measures.47  Some of 
those measures aimed, and succeeded, in creating a common institutional 
framework in which national officials in charge of disability policies could 
exchange information and in this process learn from each other‘s 
experiences.  But the framework also had perverse effects.  First, it 
reinforced the presuppositions of the medical model that shaped the social 
policy of the Member States.  Second, it failed to ―socialize‖ those states 
into opening up their disability policies to the Community‘s outside scrutiny 
with bite.  Member States proved willing to join in the Community‘s 
information exchange networks as long as the costs of participation were 
low to nonexistent.48  But as soon as the Community tried to ―harden‖ its 
soft measures, for instance by enabling its institutions to follow through 
 
 43. Council Resolution Concerning a Social Action Program (EC) of 21 January 
1974, art. 7, 1974 O.J. (C 013). 
 44. See Rachel Hurst, The International Disability Rights Movement and the ICF, 25 
DISABILITY & REHABILITATION 572, 572 (2003). 
 45. See LISA WADDINGTON, DISABILITY, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY 21(1995) [hereinafter WADDINGTON, DISABILITY, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY]. 
 46. See, e.g., Council Resolution Establishing the Initial Community Action 
Program for the Vocational Rehabilitation of Handicapped Persons (EC) of 27 June 
1974, 1974 O.J. (C 80) 30, (―The general aim of Community efforts on behalf of the 
handicapped must be to help these people to become capable of leading a normal 
independent life fully integrated into society.‖).  See also WADDINGTON, DISABILITY, 
EMPLOYMENT, AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 45, at 100 (―the [1974 action 
program] speaks of the need to ‗help these people,‘ rather than to ‗enable‘ disabled 
people to help themselves. Furthermore, no reference is made to the need to consult 
disabled people on a wide scale, and encourage their participation in the formulation and 
implementation of policy.‖). 
 47. Soft law measures are legal rules that do not have binding character. For a 
general discussion, see LINDA SENDEN, SOFT LAW IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 
(2004). 
 48. One such example is the creation of the European Network of Rehabilitation 
Centers.  See WADDINGTON, DISABILITY, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 
supra note 45, at 99.  
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with the national implementation of goals in areas such as employment, the 
Member States were quick to exercise their veto powers.49  Similarly, 
attempts to pass secondary legislation in areas such as transportation of 
persons with disabilities were also unsuccessful.50  As one commentator 
summed it up, the overall impact of disability-specific initiatives was 
―minimal.‖51  
There are a number of possible explanations for the reluctance of 
Member States to commit themselves to enhanced cooperation in this area 
during that period.  First, national governments were keen to protect their 
turf vis-à-vis Community encroachment in subject matters such as health 
policy and social security.  Second, since implementation of disability 
policy can be expensive, national governments were unwilling to submit 
themselves voluntarily to supranational control with significant financial 
implications.  Third, disability policy never became a priority to any 
powerful stakeholders and thus could not be the object of grand political 
bargaining.  All three explanations point to disability policy falling outside 
the hard economic core of the Community project.  But one can also 
interpret these explanations as flowing from the political implications of the 
medical model itself.  When disability is understood as the effect of medical 
impairments, rather than as the effect of social arrangements, there is 
limited payoff to investing scarce political capital into disability policy.  
For all their limited success, these early programs had one long-lasting 
impact that eventually shaped the future of disability policy in Europe.  
These programs provided the institutional framework and secured funding 
for the continuing existence of the European Disability Forum (the ―EDF‖) 
as an umbrella organization at the Community level of the national 
disability rights movements.52  In a strategy typical of the Commission‘s 
general template of entanglement with social movements, the creation of the 
EDF was in part the Commission‘s political attempt to bypass rigid national 
 
 49.  See LISA WADDINGTON, FROM ROME TO NICE IN A WHEELCHAIR: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A EUROPEAN DISABILITY POLICY 6–7 (2006) [hereinafter 
WADDINGTON, FROM ROME TO NICE]. 
 50. See, e.g., Commission Proposal for a Directive on Minimum Requirements to 
Improve the Mobility and the Safe Transport to Work of Workers with Reduced 
Mobility. COM (1991) 558 final (Feb. 28, 1991); WADDINGTON, FROM ROME TO NICE, 
supra note 49, at 7–8.   
 51. See WADDINGTON, FROM ROME TO NICE, supra note 49, at 13 (―This was 
especially true of the policy initiatives. Member States were reluctant to accept binding 
obligations at [that] time, and unwilling to comply with recommendations requiring 
concrete changes.‖); see also WADDINGTON, DISABILITY, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 45.  In his recent work, Daniel Kelemen points to 
failures of this type in arguing against descriptive claims about European integration 
through soft law.  See KELEMEN, supra note 26, at 29–32. 
 52. See C. Quittkat & B. Finke, The EU Commission Consultation Regime, in 
OPENING EU-GOVERNANCE TO CIVIL SOCIETY: GAINS AND CHALLENGES 194, 201 (Beate 
Kohler-Koch, Dirk De Bièvre & William Maloney eds., 2008).  The EDF, which was 
created with funds from the Helios II program, continues to be very active.  See 
WADDINGTON, FROM ROME TO NICE, supra note 49, at 18; The European Disability 
Forum, http://www.edf-feph.org/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).   
PERJU FORMATTED 5/16/20115/16/11  1:58 PM10:37 AM 
114 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 44 
governments and bureaucracies by reaching out directly to stakeholders—in 
this case, the disability rights movement.  Moreover, Community funding 
guaranteed that the Commission would have influence over the EDF‘s 
political choreography.  Thus, the Commission not only gained an important 
ally but also secured control over that ally‘s political activities.53  The 
impact of the EDF in the next decades, often in the form of effective 
advocacy for American-type rights-based antidiscrimination, cannot be 
overstated.  Its policy papers produced in the early 1990s, which advocated 
that discrimination should be expanded from race and gender to include 
disability, prepared the ground for the transformation of Community 
disability policy in the late 1990s.54  
B. Discovering the Body Politic: The Antidiscrimination Model in the 
United States  
Since the end of the First World War, federal statutes in the United 
States concerning persons with disabilities focused mainly on vocational 
training and social security protection.  Disability advocacy started in the 
1960s on student campuses such as U.C. Berkeley, spurred by students with 
disabilities for whom educational opportunities had only recently become 
available.  The early campaigns were successful in creating campus 
accommodation followed in due course, and with federal funding,55 by the 
organization of a parallel program for nonstudents.  Coordinated by persons 
with disabilities, these centers for independent living (―CIL‖), the first of 
which was incorporated in 1972, took a holistic approach to the question of 
social integration.56  They gained visibility among disability advocates both 
nationally and transnationally.  During this time, disability advocates from 
Europe would visit the CIL regularly to draw inspiration for how to fight 
their battles at home more successfully.57  However, the relative insularity 
of the CIL meant that their advocacy was insufficient to generate a broad 
 
 53. The alliance paid off, at least in the short run.  Indeed, only recently has the EDF 
spoken out against the Commission‘s disability policies.  See Open Letter to José Manuel 
Barroso, President of the European Commission, (2008), available at http://www.edf-
feph.org/Page_Generale.asp?DocID=17951&thebloc=22810 (last visited Feb. 11, 2010)  
(arguing strongly for a comprehensive disability-only directive and noting that civil 
society had not been consulted on the Commission‘s proposal for a new anti-
discrimination directive). 
 54. See Commission Communication on Equality of Opportunity for People With 
Disabilities: A New European Community Disability Strategy, COM (1996) 406 final 
(Jul. 30, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 EC Disability Strategy].  
 55. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 50, 53 (1994).  
 56. Id. at 53–58.  
 57. See Heyer, supra note 31, at 736 (describing the ―the love affair‖ between the 
German disability groups and the American disability advocates). ―Many German 
disability groups travelled to the United States to learn about the movement there and 
returned full of enthusiasm and optimism about what might be possible with a paradigm 
shift from charity and dependence to equal rights and self-determination.  It is safe to say 
that all the leading figures in Germany‘s movement today have made at least one trip to 
the United States, most commonly to Berkeley.‖  Id. at 734.  
PERJU FORMATTED  5/16/20115/16/11  1:58 PM10:37 AM 
2011 Impairment, Discrimination, and the Legal Construction 115 
social movement capable of putting disability policy on the political agenda.  
As one looks for the causes of the early disability reforms in the second half 
of the twentieth century, one will not find an outside social movement 
exerting pressure on the state.  Rather, during that time, ―the social 
movement was in the government.‖58  
In the early 1970s, after failed attempts to list disability as a prohibited 
ground for discrimination alongside race or national origin in Title VI of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act,59 Congress included a provision in the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 (regarding federal aid for vocational training) mandating that 
―no otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . . . 
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefit of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.‖60  The inclusion of this 
provision, which became Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, was not a 
response to societal pressure, but rather it was the outcome of what one 
commentator aptly calls ―anticipatory politics.‖61  Specifically, it reflected 
the views of government insiders—in particular Congressional staffers—
who came to see persons with disabilities as a minority group engaged in a 
struggle for recognition similar to that of the civil rights and the women‘s 
movements.  
Because the Rehabilitation Act covered an array of fields ranging from 
education to transportation, as well as any other federally-run or federally-
funded program, it became necessary to define the meaning of 
―handicapped individual‖ for the purpose of section 504.62  It was at this 
critical moment that the perspective shifted in a quasi-official way from 
medical impairment to a political focus on issues of societal 
discrimination.63  The term ―handicapped individual‖ was interpreted to 
 
 58. JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION 269 (2002); see also 
RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL 
DISABILITY POLICY 41–43 (2001).  
 59. See id. at 268 (arguing that the attempt to amend Title VI failed due to the 
timing of the legislative proposal).  Cf. Burke, supra note 15, at 162 (arguing that the 
failure was due to fear of opening up the Act or the distinctiveness of disability from the 
other grounds listed in the Act).  
 60. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat 355, codified at 29 U.S.C. 701, et seq; 29 U.S.C. § 
794.  The language of the provision was almost identical with that in Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which applied to sex 
discrimination. 
 61. SKRENTNY, supra note 58, at 270 (describing how the staffers anticipated that 
the disabled would want what they were given); see id. at 269. 
 62. The Rehabilitation Act was not the first act applying to ―handicapped persons.‖  
See Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970) 
(mandating, for the first time, that children with disabilities were entitled to receive free 
and appropriate public education). 
 63. Some observers credit the lawyers in the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare with this shift.  See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 99–100 (describing how, under 
the social model, ―it was myths, fears and stereotypes about people with disabilities that 
often hampered such individuals‘ involvement and advancement in society, not the 
objective reality of any impact their physical or mental impairment had on their ability to 
function, perform, or contribute to society.‖). 
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refer to ―any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which 
substantially limits one or more of such person‘s major life activities, (ii) 
has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an 
impairment.‖64  This definition would prove more resilient over the 
following decade than many could have predicted.  The definition was later 
incorporated into the ADA and retained in the ADAAA.  It is a definition 
that shares the assumptions of the social model in its second and third 
prongs, and arguably in the first prong as well.  As one commentator noted, 
―[e]ven people whose conditions have no ongoing medical significance may 
experience the prejudice, stereotypes, and neglect that make up disability-
based disadvantage . . . [t]hat is the basic insight reflected in the ‗regarded 
as‘ and ‗record‘ prongs.‖65  
This basic insight turned out to have unpalatable political 
consequences.  However close the analogy between discrimination on the 
basis of disability and discrimination on the grounds of race or gender, that 
analogy dissipated as soon as the costs of implementing the former 
measures became apparent.  It is one thing to force universities that benefit 
from federal funding to stop discriminating on the basis of race, but it is 
quite another to make them provide reasonable accommodation for students 
with disabilities.  Confronted with such costs, the executive branch would 
have delayed sine die the issuing of implementation regulations if it were 
not for the pressure of outside disability groups that by then had begun 
building up their strength. Organizing that pressure marked ―the political 
coming of age of the disability rights movement,‖66 as the movement 
succeeded in getting a reluctant Carter administration to allocate the 
necessary resources and issue the implementation regulations of Section 504 
four years after its enactment.67  The shared legal imaginary of modern 
struggles for recognition is also noteworthy.  The rhetoric that galvanized 
the disability rights movement borrowed heavily from the civil rights 
movement: protesters framed their opposition to ―separate but equal 
facilities‖ and celebrated their success against the administration with 
chants of ―We Have Overcome.‖68 
 
 64. H.R. 17503, 93rd Cong. 2nd Sess. (1974) (codified at 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 
(2005)). 
 65. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,‖ 86 VA. L. REV. 
397, 470 (2000) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Subordination].  
 66. SHAPIRO, supra note 55, at 68.  
 67. For the story of the sit-in in the San Francisco regional office of the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare, see id. at 68–69.   
 68. See id.; see also Richard K. Scotch, Politics and Policy in the History of the 
Disability Rights Movement, MILBANK Q.  380, 386 (1989) (hereinafter Scotch, Politics 
and Policy] (―The shape of the disability rights movement and perhaps its very existence 
has been the result of available models of these other movements, which have provided 
examples of political action and ideological frameworks, and which also served as 
sources of cooperation and competition.‖).  This is not an exclusively American 
phenomenon.  For similar cross-influences in the Canadian context, see Lisa Vanhala, 
Twenty-five Years of Disability Equality? Interpreting Disability Rights in the Supreme 
Court of Canada, 39 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 27, 31 (2010).   
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Once the implementation regulations were in place and Section 504 
was in effect, discrimination against the disabled was shown to be ―nearly 
everywhere.‖69  Its roots were so deep and its forms of manifestation so 
diverse and far reaching that the Rehabilitation Act, which applied solely to 
federal or federally-funded entities, was soon perceived as insufficient in 
rooting out discrimination against persons with disabilities.  The perceived 
necessity for comprehensive legislation that transcended the federal/non-
federal divide by granting rights enforceable in courts provided the 
movement‘s rallying cry.  As one commentator pointed out, ―[d]espite the 
extraordinary diversity of the community of people with disabilities, 
disability groups held together largely on the need for a rights law.‖70  The 
legacy of previous struggles for recognition, with their demands for 
enforceable rights, as well as the relatively thorough job of the judiciary 
applying Section 504, explain the calls during the 1980s for comprehensive 
rights-based legislation.71
 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 answered that call.  The 
Act covered a wide range of areas and social services, from employment to 
public transportation, private accommodations, and means of 
communication.72  The ADA required any employer with more than 15 
employees to provide ―reasonable accommodation‖ to persons with 
disabilities, provided the accommodation would not be an ―undue 
hardship‖; private employers‘ failure to provide reasonable accommodation 
constituted discrimination.73  Under the new regime, the ADA created a 
cause of action in federal courts for employees seeking redress.74  This 
horizontal spread of disability protections is unsurprising from the 
perspective of the social model.  The legislative findings incorporated into 
the statute reflect that model‘s conceptual apparatus by noting that 
―historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with 
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of disability 
continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.‖75  At the same time, 
 
 69. SKRENTNY, supra note 58, at 273.  
 70. Burke, supra note 15, at 163. 
 71. The social movement had grown stronger and more influential by 1990 when the 
ADA was enacted.  Some scholars have argued, however, that the movement still lacked 
visibility and hence that it might not have been in a position to defend the Act‘s 
application.  See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword – Backlash Against the ADA: 
Interdisciplinary Perspective and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 11 (2000) [hereinafter Krieger, Foreword]. 
 72. See Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et 
seq.). 
 73. ADA Title I, 42 U.S.C. §§12111 (5), (9), (10); 12112(b)(5)(a).  A similar stance 
would be taken by the 2006 UN Convention, which is reminiscent of the EU position.  
See Commission Staff Working Paper: Disability Mainstreaming in the European 
Employment Strategy, at 3, COM (2005) EMCO/11/290605 (Jul. 1, 2005) (―Failure to 
provide reasonable accommodation in the workplace can constitute discrimination . . . 
[r]easonable accommodation is not a positive action left to the discretion of public and 
private operators, but an obligation whose failure can constitute unfair discrimination.‖). 
 74. ADA Title I, 42 U.S.C. §12117(a).  
 75. Id. § 12101(a)(2).  See also ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
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enforceable rights are the main tool in the ADA‘s toolkit.  It is important to 
understand the rights-centered antidiscrimination regime as the specific 
form of the social model in American law. 
Its supporters hailed the Act as ―the most comprehensive civil rights 
legislation passed by Congress since the 1964 Civil Rights Act.‖76 
Newspapers called it ―a second independence day.‖77  The Act continued in 
the tradition of broad, bi-partisan political support that had been a staple of 
previous disability legislation.78  It was noted at the time that ―the ADA . . . 
is unlike any other major piece of civil rights legislation enacted by 
Congress because there was no serious opposition.‖79  The two political 
parties supported the legislation for different reasons: Republicans because 
it promised to end the era of welfare dependency of persons with disabilities 
and Democrats because of its continuity with previous struggles by 
disadvantaged groups for recognition.80  As one commentator has observed, 
―lack of visible opposition to disability rights proposals is a pattern one sees 
in all the polities in which such proposals have reached the legislative 
agenda.‖81  In fact, at the signing ceremony of the ADA, President Bush 
compared the adoption of the act to the demolition of the Berlin Wall.82  
 
325, 112 Stat. 3553 § 2, (a)(2)  (―in enacting the ADA, Congress recognized that 
physical and mental disabilities in no way diminish a person‘s right to fully participate in 
all aspects of society, but that people with physical or mental disabilities are frequently 
precluded from doing so because of prejudice. . .‖); Krieger, Afterword, supra note 17, at 
481 (―[T]he drafters of the ADA sought to transform the institution of disability by 
locating responsibility for disablement not only in a disabled person‘s impairments, but 
also in ‗disabling‘ physical and structural environments.‖). 
 76. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 139.   
 77. Diller, supra note 25, at 19 (citing Terry Wilson, For the Disabled, It‟s 
„Independence Day,‘ CHI. TRIB., July 27, 1990, at 1).  
 78. See Krieger, Foreword, supra note 71, at 1 (noting that the vote in the House of 
Representatives was 377-28 and in the Senate was 91-6).  
 79. RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 23 (2005).  
 80. See id. at 34, 54. 
 81. Burke, supra note15, at 167.  Indeed, as the New York Times wrote one year 
before the ADA was adopted, ―No politician can vote against this bill and survive.‖ 
Blank Check for the Disabled, NY Times, Sep. 6, 1989, at A24 (cited in COLKER, supra 
note 79, at 1).  
 82. See Krieger, Foreword, supra note 71, at 1.  The same is reflected in the ADA‘s 
signing statement: ―The Americans with Disabilities Act presents us all with an historic 
opportunity.  It signals the end to the unjustified segregation and exclusions of persons 
with disabilities from the mainstream of American life.  As the Declaration of 
Independence has been a beacon for people all over the world seeking freedom, it is my 
hope that the Americans with Disabilities Act will likewise come to be a model for the 
choices and opportunities of future generations around the world.‖ (President George H. 
W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, July 26, 
1990).  Though domestic policies often have foreign policy implications, the foreign 
policy implications of U.S. disability policy are nevertheless noteworthy.  See NATIONAL 
COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, FOREIGN POLICY AND DISABILITY 1 (2001) (―The unparalleled 
legal protection given Americans through the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and other 
disability rights laws won the admiration of people with disabilities, human rights 
activists, and people of goodwill around the world.  These laws underscored the 
authority of the United States to speak not only as a rich and powerful nation but also as 
PERJU FORMATTED  5/16/20115/16/11  1:58 PM10:37 AM 
2011 Impairment, Discrimination, and the Legal Construction 119 
The definition of disability in the ADA remained unchanged from the 
one used in Section 504.  The decision to retain the impairment-based 
definition of the Rehabilitation Act, which would play a key role in the 
judiciary‘s application ratione personae of the Act, was not disputed during 
the drafting process.83  Although some of the previous drafts proposed a 
more detailed definition, it was believed that retaining the existing 
definition was advisable given courts‘ familiarity with it.84  A calculus about 
risk allocation and institutional behavior trumped whatever considerations 
there might have been, from a social model standpoint, to re-center the 
definition of disability on societal discrimination rather than on medical 
impairment.  In a sense, that calculus was understandable.  Under Section 
504, disability had been interpreted to cover ‗traditional‘ disabilities, such as 
blindness or deafness, as well as medical conditions, such as diabetes or 
epilepsy.  It also covered people with a record of disabilities and those 
whose medical conditions, such as asymptomatic HIV, have disabling 
effects that carry societal stigma.85  It was only later, when courts started 
departing from the broad interpretation of disability, that the consequences 
of retaining this definition of disability became clear.  Clarifying Congress‘ 
aims retrospectively, the 2008 ADAAA states that ―while [it] expected that 
the definition of disability under the ADA would be interpreted consistently 
with how courts had applied the definition of a handicapped individual 
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that expectation [had] not been 
fulfilled.‖86  However, it is telling that even in 2008, Congress refused to 
modify the definition of disability and considered it sufficient to direct 
courts to ―construe (the definition of disability) in favor of broad coverage 
of individuals . . . , to the maximum extent permitted by this chapter.‖87 
To be sure, there was more in the ADA than the interpretation of the 
definition of disability that surprised its initial supporters.  As far as 
employment levels were concerned, unemployment levels for persons with 
disabilities stayed high.  The causal connection between the existence of 
disability and poverty levels remained strong.  Both the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) and the Social Security Disability Outcome (SSDI) 
grew larger throughout the 1990s.88  Why exactly the ADA‘s effects have 
 
a good and moral one.  By demonstrating its strong commitment to the equality of all 
people, including those with disabilities, the United States strengthened its global 
position.‖  (quoted in Arlene S. Kanter, The Globalization of Disability Rights Law, 30 
SYRACUSE J. INT‘L L. & COM. 241, 248 (2003))).  
 83. See Feldblum, supra note18, at 129.  The issue was so low key that, as one 
commentator involved in the negotiations writes, ―the Section 504 definition of disability 
was hardly a topic of conversation in the negotiations over the ADA.‖ Id. 
 84. See id. at 126–134.  
 85. For an account of just how bold the approach was, see Krieger, Foreword, supra 
note 71, at 3.  
 86. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553 § 2, (a)(3) 
(2008).  
 87. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553 § 4 
(2008).  
 88. See Burke, supra note15, at 163.  
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fallen far short of expectations is a matter of dispute.  Some observers place 
the blame on the courts; others have pointed to the mistaken reliance on a 
model of accommodation mandates for private employers.89  Still others 
have pointed to limitations inherent in the antidiscrimination model, which 
does not deliver the broad social welfare reforms indispensable for the 
social integration of persons with disabilities.90  Some scholars have pointed 
to unresolved contradictions in the eclectic strategies and demands 
originating from within the social disability movement.91  While it is beyond 
the purpose of the paper to adjudicate definitively these different accounts, I 
submit that the comparison with the European Union brings to the surface 
some tensions inherent in both the social model as well as in the 
adjudication of the social model that remain obscured when the focus is 
solely on the American experience.  What makes the comparative analysis 
even possible is that, for all its shortcomings, the ADA‘s rights-based model 
has been tremendously influential abroad.  Indeed, it has been so successful 
that observers have quipped that the Act has been more influential abroad, 
and especially in Europe, than at home.92 
C. Trans-Systemic Influences: The Migration of the Antidiscrimination 
Model from the United States to Europe 
The ADA‘s influence at the level of the European Community in the 
early 1990s occurred mostly via the U.S.-inspired advocacy of the European 
Disability Forum (EDF). In 1994, the EDF published a white paper that 
introduced the discrimination paradigm, which, together with a study 
released the year before in which the EDF brought the concept of dignity to 
bear on the plight of persons with disabilities, opened the way for a shift in 
Community policy.93  In 1996, the Commission issued ―A European 
Community Disability Strategy,‖94 which transformed the Community‘s 
disability policies.  Integration replaced accommodation as the regulative 
ideal of the Community disability policy.95  The document took a rather 
uncharitable view of the charity model that had characterized Community 
policy over the previous two decades.  After ―rethinking [the] many years of 
public policy aimed at accommodating people to their disabilities,‖ which it 
now deemed ―insufficient,‖ the Commission embraced the fundamental 
 
 89. See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992). 
 90. See e.g., Stein & Stein, supra note 25. 
 91. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 24.  
 92. See id. at 11 (―The ADA, for all its limitations, has made our society more 
accessible, so much so that the United States is the envy of disability rights activists 
around the world.‖).  
 93. See generally Commission Green Paper on European Social Policy, COM (93) 
551 (Nov. 17, 1993). 
 94. 1996 EC Disability Strategy, supra note 54.   
 95. The Council endorsed the social model approach a year later.  Council 
Resolution on Equality of Opportunity for People with Disabilities (EU) of 20 December 
1996, 1997 O.J. (C 12) 1, 2.  
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insight of the social model that ―changes in the way we organize our 
societies can substantially reduce or even overcome obstacles found by 
people with disability.‖96 The absence— or ―virtual invisibility‖—of 
persons with disabilities from the mainstream perpetuated stereotypes and 
the continuation of cycles of exclusion.  
If integration, or mainstreaming,97 represented the new goal of 
Community disability policy, there were some changes in the means by 
which the Community sought to accomplish it.  The persistent lack of a 
legal basis for antidiscrimination measures, through the 1990s, compelled 
the Community to continue relying exclusively on the soft law measures 
that had characterized its past disability policies.98  At the same time, the 
emphasis on antidiscrimination made rights central to the new disability 
strategy.99  The reasons for choosing a rights-based strategy are not 
immediately apparent.  Indeed, if the problems of discrimination are 
structural, deep, and broad, as advocates of the social model argue, then an 
emphasis on rights is somewhat mystifying.  In the American context, the 
rights formulation of the social model is understandable given that rights 
have historically provided the template in which struggles for recognition 
are carried out.  But, why a rights approach in Europe?  
To start, one should note that the antidiscrimination model was also 
normatively consistent with the social model of disability, which advocated 
against a passive stance of persons with disabilities and in favor of enabling 
them to make demands on social institutions.  Secondly, disability is not the 
first instance where the Community used rights as a template against 
discrimination.100  For instance, in the gender context, Article 119 in the 
original Treaty of Rome stipulated the principle of equal pay for men and 
 
 96. 1996 EC Disability Strategy, supra note 54. 
 97. Id. at 8 (defining mainstreaming as ―the formulation of policy to facilitate the 
full participation and involvement of people with disabilities in economic, social and 
other processes, while respecting personal choice — the relevant issues should no longer 
be considered separately from the mainstream policy-making apparatus.‖).  
 98. See Deborah Mabbett, The Development of Rights-based Social Policy in the 
European Union: The Example of Disability Rights, 43 J. COMMON MKT. STUDIES 97, 
102 (2005). 
 99. See Council Resolution on Equality of Opportunity for People with Disabilities 
(EU) of 20 December 1996, 1997 O.J. (C 12) 1, 2.  
 100. ―Template‖ here should be understood broadly.  As commentators have rightly 
noted, there are significant differences between discrimination based on race and 
disability on the one hand, and gender on the other.  See Lisa Waddington & Mark Bell, 
More Equal than Others: Distinguishing European Union Equality Directives, 38 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 587, 588 (2001) [hereinafter Waddington & Bell, More Equal 
than Others] (―In adopting these new directives the Community has not simply extended 
the already existing protection, standards and concepts applicable with regard to sex 
discrimination to the newly covered areas.‖).  However, the commonalities among these 
struggles for recognition remained strong despite relevant differences among gender, 
race and disability.  See KELEMEN, supra note 26, at 213 (―The disability rights 
movement rode the rights wave that was sweeping over EU politics at the end of the 
1990s, gaining strength by linking its fortunes to those of other human rights and 
antidiscrimination causes.‖)   
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women at work.101  Over time, the sphere of application of the principle 
expanded to cover access to employment, vocational training and working 
conditions,102 as well as occupational social security schemes.103  
Interestingly, this expansion of gender equality was achieved under pressure 
from the judiciary,104 which was itself called upon to act as part of the larger 
mobilization of the social movement.105  The mainstreaming approach, 
which has been successfully advocated in the case of disability rights106, was 
also the strategy that the Treaty of Amsterdam would later endorse for 
gender equality.  Yet despite its lack of novelty as a tool, there was no 
tradition at the level of the European Community for using courts for social 
change through rights adjudication.  
For all the influence of the American approach to disability rights, it is 
important to note that the American model was not transplanted tale quale.  
For instance, unlike its counterpart disability rights movement in the United 
States, the EDF has no history of engaging in litigation as a means for 
achieving social change.107  Moreover, the social model itself went through 
a number of adaptations required by the European legal framework. 
Borrowing the vocabulary of social systems theory, one can say that the 
social model was translated by the Community‘s own jurisprudential 
vocabulary—or ―code‖—to require that broader social measures supplement 
an American-type antidiscrimination model.  First, the American model 
received a specifically European, principle-centered expression.108  The 
European rights strategy takes as a starting point the principle of equality, 
which entails the concept of equal opportunities that itself subsumes the 
principle of non-discrimination.109  Second, the antidiscrimination model 
became part of a broader understanding of the social model that implied, but 
 
 101. Treaty of Rome, supra note 35, art. 119. 
 102. See Council Directive 76/207/EEC, 1976 O.J. (L 039) 40–42.  
 103. See Council Directive 86/378/ EEC, 1986 O.J. (L 225) 40–43.   
 104. See Gráinne de Búrca, Stumbling into Experimentalism: The EU Anti-
Discrimination Regime, in EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
215, 219 (Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2009).  
 105. See id. at 219.  
 106. See id. at 220; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, art. 10, Sep. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 68 [hereinafter TFEU] (―In 
defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation.‖). 
 107. See WADDINGTON, FROM ROME TO NICE, supra note 49, at 19 (describing the 
activities of the EDF as including campaigning at the European level and active 
involvement in policy development and implementation in the EU).  
 108. See generally ARMIN VON BOGDANDY, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2006). 
 109. For this conceptual scheme, see 1996 EC Disability Strategy, supra note 54. See 
also Case C 555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci. v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, 2010 E.C.R. I-
0000. For an analysis of the application and scope of the principle of non-discrimination 
in EU law after Kücükdeveci, see Anja Wiesbrock, Case Note, Case C 555/07 
Kücükdeveci. v. Swedex, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 19 January 2010, 
11 GERMAN L.J. 539 (2010). 
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was not reduced to, rights. Unlike in the United States, Community policies 
do not evidence the need for choosing between rights and broader social 
measures.  The roots of the American perception of a stark, binary choice 
can be traced to a general distrust of the state, which created ambiguities at 
the heart of the civil rights or women‘s rights movements.  But specifically 
in the disability context, the rejection of broad social measures under the 
antidiscrimination (civil rights) model also has to do with how that model 
established itself in contrast to the earlier social welfare model with its 
emphasis on medical impairments and paternalistic social implications.  The 
distrust of the state and the culture of individualism would have perhaps 
made the battle particularly stark in the United States, even if it had been 
fought at the same time both there and in Europe.  But, in fact, by the time 
the EDF brought it to Europe, that battle had already been fought in the 
United States and it had shaped the collective memory of the disability 
advocates.  Some of those memories will be lost as the antidiscrimination 
model becomes acculturated on European soil.  The European social 
tradition softened what American advocates of the antidiscrimination model 
perceived as a stark choice between rights and broader social policy.  
Placing rights within the broader social model had a reinvigorating 
effect on Community disability policy, particularly on its soft law programs.  
Once the social model moved toward the center, the politics of equality was 
re-energized as soft law measures became more ambitious and less vague.  
These measures ranged from political dialogue among Member States, 
which resulted in the creation of the High Level Group of Member States‘ 
Representatives on Disability, to social dialogue between employees and 
unions and civil dialogue among NGOs.110  Later documents spell out these 
ambitious measures in greater detail, for instance the use of the open 
method of coordination in the areas of employment, social inclusion, and 
lifelong learning.111  This was possible because the Commission retained 
throughout this period its role of coordinator and facilitator of information-
exchange among the Member States.112 
D. Disability Rights: The Social Model in Europe (after 1996) 
The 1996 policy shift to the social model of disability at the 
Community level occurred as Member States were negotiating the Treaty of 
Amsterdam.  In addition to the changes in the overall institutional structure, 
the Treaty (signed in 1997 and in force two years later), provided for the 
first time the legal basis necessary to combat with traditional, ―hard‖ legal 
measures discrimination on a number of grounds, including disability.  
Adopted after long-standing opposition mounted by the conservative UK 
 
 110. See 1996 EC Disability Strategy, supra note 54, at 4, 10–11. 
 111. See 2003 European Action Plan, supra note 12, at 4–6. 
 112. See 2003 European Action Plan, supra note 12, at 12. (―Most actions in the field 
of disability are principally a matter of Member State responsibility and most effectively 
dealt with at national level.‖). 
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government,113  Article 13 (now Art 19-1 TFEU) expanded the traditional 
ban on discrimination based on nationality in Article 12 (now Art 18 TFEU) 
to enable the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, to ―take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation.‖114  The unanimity requirement in the 
Council and its lack of direct effect indicate the sensitive political nature of 
this provision.115 
Within a year after the Treaty of Amsterdam came into effect, the 
Community had already adopted two directives under Article 13.  The first 
was the Race Equality Directive, which prohibited discrimination on the 
ground of race and ethnic origin in fields such as employment, vocational 
training, education, social protection, and access to goods and services.116  
The second directive was the Employment Equality Directive, known as the 
Framework Directive.117  This Directive prohibited direct and indirect 
discrimination, including harassment, on the basis of religion or belief, 
disability, age, or sexual orientation in the areas of access to employment, 
self-employment, occupation, vocational guidance, and training.118  The 
Framework Directive, which applies to both private and public employers, 
transplants into Community law the American model of reasonable 
accommodation for persons with disabilities.119  Importantly, like Article 13 
itself, the directive does not define disability.  As the next section shows in 
detail, this policy choice set the stage for the European Court of Justice to 
 
 113. United Kingdom White Paper of 12 March 1996 on the IGC: an association of 
nations, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/pos-en_en.htm (―On 
European citizenship, human rights and non-discrimination, the UK Government does 
not believe the EU is an appropriate forum for the protection of fundamental human 
rights, and opposes introducing a general non-discrimination clause covering gender, 
sexual orientation, race, religion, age and disability.  In general, the UK is concerned that 
the creation of new rights might lead to the need to establish new duties, something 
which it does not favour on the grounds that the EU is not a state as such.‖). 
 114. Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, art. 13, 1997 O.J. (C340) 1. 
 115. The same remains true under the Lisbon regime.  Treaty of Lisbon Amending 
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Communities 
art. 19(1), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 24 (―Without prejudice to the other 
provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the 
Union, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take 
appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.‖). 
 116. Council Directive 2000/43/EC, art. 3, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 24. 
 117. Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16.  
 118. See id. at 18–19, arts. 1–3. 
 119. See id. at 19, art. 5. For an argument about the influence of American law, see 
WADDINGTON, FROM ROME TO NICE, supra note 49, at 24 (―It is submitted that (the 
ADA) directly influenced the drafting of Art. 5 of the Framework Employment 
Directive.  In particular, it is submitted that the term ‗reasonable accommodation‘ . . . 
was determinant of the terminology used in Article 5.  A conscious choice was made to 
use the term ‗reasonable accommodation‘ in the Directive because of the level of 
familiarity with this particular element of the ADA amongst relevant Commission staff, 
some Member States, and disability NGOs.‖). 
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fill in the Community meaning of disability.  
The Framework Directive was the Community‘s first rights-conferring 
instrument for persons with disabilities.120  The rhetoric surrounding its 
adoption matches the rhetoric around the ADA.  The Commission referred 
to it in glowing terms as a path-breaking piece of legislation.121  It forecast 
the Directive‘s ―very great‖ impact given that the new regulatory framework 
would require ―major changes‖ in the legal systems of Member States, with 
―huge implications‖ for employers.122  A first glance at its provisions would 
make such statements surprisingly self-congratulatory.  Compared to the 
regime that applies to discrimination on the basis of race or gender, the 
provisions in the Framework Directive are rather general and open-ended.  
For instance, unlike the Race Directive—but like the American ADA—the 
Framework Directive does not stipulate the creation of a specialized body 
for the promotion of equal treatment on the grounds of race and ethnic 
origin.  Reflected here is a more general view that, given wide differences in 
the nature of the employment market within the different Member States, 
national governments need the leeway necessary to achieve their desired 
aims.  At the same time, allowing for leeway legitimizes the argument that 
there is a hierarchy of grounds and legal regimes within the European 
equality jurisprudence, with race at the top followed by gender and then 
disability and age, and finally sexual orientation.123  However, the 
enthusiasm regarding the disability part of the Directive is easier to 
understand once one recalls that, at the time of its adoption, only the UK, 
Ireland, and Sweden had comprehensive civil laws prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of disability.124  While even those legal systems 
had to at least face the possibility of having to amend their legislation in 
order to implement the Directive, 125 the Directive would have far-reaching 
 
 120. See generally Richard Whittle, The Framework Directive for Equal Treatment in 
Employment and Occupation: An Analysis from a Disability Rights Perspective, 27 EUR. 
L. REV. 303, 305 (2002).  
 121. See Commission Staff Working Paper: Disability Mainstreaming in the 
European Employment Strategy, at 3, COM (2005) EMCO/11/290605 (Jul. 1, 2005).  
For an analysis of the Commission‘s broader strategy of regulation under conditions of 
political fragmentation through justiciable rights, in the disability area and beyond, see 
KELEMEN, supra note 26, 208–224. 
 122. 2003 European Action Plan, supra note 1212, at 15.  
 123. See Waddington & Bell, More Equal than Others, supra note 100, at 610–
11(noting this hierarchy and arguing that it is a result of political pragmatism).  
 124. See Mark Bell & Lisa Waddington, Reflecting Inequalities in European Equality 
Law, 28 EUR.L. REV. 349, 367 (2003). [hereinafter Bell & Waddington, Reflecting 
Inequalities in European Equality Law].  For instance, the UK Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995 defines a disabled person as a person with ―a physical or mental impairment 
which has a substantial and long term adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal 
day-to-day activities.‖  DDA, Section 1 (1).  Employers have routinely challenged 
whether the plaintiffs are disabled under the Act, thus giving courts ample opportunities 
to develop an extensive jurisprudence with respect to all four parts of the definition 
(―impairment,‖ ―adverse effect,‖ ―substantial condition,‖ and ―long-term condition‖).  
See Goodwin v. Patent Office, [1999] I.C.R. 302 [308] – [310](Eng.). 
 125. See Bell & Waddington, Reflecting Inequalities in European Equality Law, 
supra note 124, at 367 n.13 (noting that the British Disability Discrimination Act does 
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implications in the legal systems that did not prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of disability.126
 
Like the Treaty itself, the Directive does not define disability.127  There 
are numerous possible reasons for not including a definition in the text of 
the Directive: an attempt to side-step the unfortunate judicial evolution of 
the ADA in the United States (or similar experiences in the UK);128 the 
difficulty in crafting a definition (it is sometimes said that ―there are . . . as 
many definitions of disability as there are disabilities‖129);130 the fact that 
Community legislation generally does not define suspect grounds, thus 
leaving that task to the ECJ;131 the political unpalatability of seeking to 
overcome differences in the definition of disability among the Member 
States; the fear that including a definition would stifle experimentation with 
regulatory regimes; the belief that the definition of disability may be less 
important under a social, as compared to a medicalized, model.132  Whatever 
the real reason for failing to include a definition of disability, the ECJ 
interpreted it as a gap that it had a duty to step in and fill.  
The Community disability policy after the enactment of the Framework 
Directive retained the spirit of the 1996 policy shift by seeking to 
incorporate rights within a larger framework.  The social model, now 
expressly mentioned in the relevant Community documents,133 was 
interpreted to legitimize a comprehensive approach to the disability 
 
not address indirect discrimination and that the provisions on reasonable accommodation 
of the Irish Employment Discrimination Act are too limited by the standards of the 
Framework Employment Directive).   
 126. See generally Lisa Waddington, Implementing the Disability Provisions of the 
Framework Employment Directive: Room for Exercising National Discretion, in 
DISABILITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 107–134 (Anna Lawson & 
Caroline Gooding eds., 2005). 
 127.  See Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16. 
 128. Katie Wells, The Impact of the Framework Employment Directive on UK 
Disability Discrimination Law, 32 INDUS. L.J.  253, 263 (2003). 
 129. See Burke, supra note 15, at 160.   
 130. See Mary Lou Breslin, Introduction in DISABILITY RIGHTS AND POLICY: 
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES xxviii (Mary Lou Breslin & Silvia Yee 
eds., 2002).   
 131. See e.g., Case C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council, 1996 E.C.R. I-
2143 (involving discrimination based on sex); Case C-249/96, Grant v South-West 
Trains Ltd, 1998 E.C.R. I-621 (involving discrimination based on sexual orientation). 
 132. I offer this as a simple conjecture.  One can in fact argue the opposite, namely 
that given the diversity of disabilities, an inclusive definition is necessary as a way of 
creating a group identity.  See Scotch, Social Movement, supra note 15, at 163 
(―‗disability‘ as a unifying concept that includes people with a wide range of physical 
and mental impairments is by no means an obvious category.‖).  Scotch then concludes 
that, for this reason, a prerequisite for collective action is the social construction and 
promulgation of an inclusive definition of disability. 
 133. See Commission Communication: Towards a Barrier Free Europe for People 
with Disabilities, at 3, COM (2000) 284 final (May 12, 2000) (―The approach to 
disability endorsed by the European Union acknowledges that environmental barriers are 
a greater impediment to participation in society than functional limitations . . . 
Responsibility for these issues remains mainly with the Member States.‖). 
PERJU FORMATTED  5/16/20115/16/11  1:58 PM10:37 AM 
2011 Impairment, Discrimination, and the Legal Construction 127 
regulation.134  If anything, the approach at that stage was too 
comprehensive.  As the Commission remarked, ―[a]ttitudes do not change 
automatically or spontaneously.  It is a complex process that requires 
coordinated and integrated policies at all levels of society in order to raise 
awareness and remove social and environmental barriers while at the same 
time enabling people with disabilities to become involved.‖135  Seen from 
this holistic perspective, the connection between disability and poverty 
becomes both visible and possible to conceptualize as the economic 
offshoot of social exclusion.136  The Community documents mention a 
three-prong policy, namely ―(1) anti-discrimination legislation and 
measures, which provide access to individual rights, (2) eliminating barriers 
in the environment that prevent disabled people from exercising their 
abilities, and (3) mainstreaming disability issues in the broad range of 
Community policies which facilitate the active inclusion of people with 
disabilities.‖137  While concepts such as ‗mainstreaming‘ are terms of art in 
Community policy,138 the pillars of the Community policy are nevertheless 
defined with striking largesse.  Indeed, one reads between the lines the 
attitude of a body that is not responsible with their application. 
Even with the social model in full swing, the Community continued to 
ascribe to itself some of its early role as coordinator of Member States.  As 
such, its responsibility for the implementation of substantive policy is 
ancillary at best: ―most actions in the field of disability are principally a 
matter of Member State responsibility and most effectively dealt with at a 
national level.‖139  Staple soft law policies also remained in place, only this 
time within a different theoretical framework—the social model—and 
complementary to hard law. Originating in the Commission is ―a 
commitment to making full use of voluntary cooperation methods which 
provide for adequate participation of all stakeholders: Member States, social 
partners, civil society, etc.‖140 The same trend continues under the Treaty of 
 
 134. See id. (calling for ―greater synergy between related issues in the fields of 
employment, education and vocational training, transport, the internal market, 
information society, new technologies and consumer policy‖). 
 135. Proposal for a Council Decision on the European Year of People with 
Disabilities, at 4, COM (2001) 271 final (Aug. 28, 2001). 
 136. See Ann Elwan, Poverty and Disability: A Survey of the Literature 14 (The 
World Bank, Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 9932, 1999) (―The evidence from 
the developed countries is that disabled people have lower incomes than non-disabled 
people, even when age is taken into account.‖). 
 137. Commission Communication: Situation of Disabled People in the Enlarged 
European Union: The European Action Plan 2006–2007, at 3, (COM (2005) 604 final 
(Nov. 28, 2005).  
 138. See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Paper: Disability Mainstreaming in the 
European Employment Strategy, at 3, COM (2005) EMCO/11/290605 (Jul. 1, 2005) 
(―Mainstreaming means that the needs of disadvantaged people need to be taken into 
account in the design of all policies and measures, and that action for the disadvantaged 
people is not limited to those policies and measures which are specifically addressing 
their needs.‖).  
 139. 2003 European Action Plan, supra note 12, at 12. 
 140. Id. at 4. 
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Lisbon, which includes both a general provision on the ―mainstreaming‖ of 
disability,141 while at the same time retaining the antidiscrimination 
paradigm.142  The European Disability Strategy for 2010-2020 details a 
comprehensive approach that requires reliance on both soft and hard law 
measures to achieve goals that range from employment and health to 
nondiscrimination, social protection, education and training.143  
The previous sections analyzed the disability reform movements in 
both the United States and Europe under the influence of the social model, 
as it was acculturated differently in these two political systems.  These 
legislative measures were bound to give rise to legal litigation.  The next 
part turns to this issue; specifically, to how the medicalized approach to 
disability survived the legislative shift towards a discrimination regime, in 
the medium provided by judicial decisions.  
II. What’s in a Name?  Judges and the Definition of Disability 
This Part documents the staying power of the medical approach to 
disability in the judicial interpretation of the definition of disability.  It 
shows that this phenomenon is present both in the U.S. and the EU.  The 
following sections identify the judicial decisions in which judges have 
exercised the greatest of powers: the power to define concepts such as 
disability and change the social, political, and legal discourse of the struggle 
for equality of persons with disabilities.  Notwithstanding significant 
differences in their respective tasks—unlike the American ADA, the 
Community Framework Directive does not include a definition of 
disability—courts have operated within similar mindsets in interpreting or 
stipulating the meaning of disability.  
A. The Definition of Disability in EU Law  
Sonia Chacón Navas had been ill at home for eight months and 
awaiting surgery when, on a Friday in May 2004, she received notification 
from her employer, Eurest Colectividades S.A., that her contract had been 
terminated, effective the following Monday.  The employer, a catering firm, 
gave Navas no explanation for her dismissal.  However, the notification 
letter acknowledged that her dismissal was ―unlawful‖ and it included the 
employer‘s offer to pay Navas financial compensation.144 
Spanish law distinguishes between ―lawful,‖ ―unlawful,‖ and ―void‖ 
dismissals.145  Lawful dismissals are dismissals that meet all statutory 
requirements of procedure and content. Dismissals are unlawful when they 
fail some of the statutory requirements, for instance, the requirement that 
 
 141. TFEU art. 10. (―In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the 
Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.‖  
 142. See id. art. 19.  
 143. See 2010 EC Disability Strategy, supra note 24. 
 144. Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 18.  
 145. See id. ¶ 21.  
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the employer justifies to the employee why she or he is dismissed.  Finally, 
void dismissals are dismissals in breach of the employee‘s public freedoms 
or fundamental rights, such as the right not to be discriminated on grounds 
such as gender or disability.  Differences in the available remedies explain 
the importance of the distinction between unlawful and void dismissals.  In 
the case of unlawful dismissals, the employer has the obligation to pay the 
former employee financial compensation.  If the dismissal is deemed void, 
the employee has the right to be reinstated in the position from which he 
was wrongfully dismissed, as well as the right to any unpaid remuneration.  
In her action before the national court, Navas sought a declaratory 
judgment that her dismissal was void on the ground that Eurest could only 
have fired her because of her illness. According to the plaintiffs, 
discrimination on grounds of illness is a form of disability discrimination.  
Navas therefore demanded that she be reinstated in her position.146 
The labor court in Madrid agreed, factually, that illness was the reason 
she was fired.147  However, it did not follow that under Spanish law, her 
dismissal was void.  First, the applicable statute did not include illness 
alongside age, disability, gender, or race as an enumerated ground that 
renders a dismissal void.  Second, it was settled precedent under Spanish 
law that ―illness‖ was distinct from ―disability,‖ and therefore could not be 
read into the prohibited grounds.  Put differently, Spanish law allowed 
Eurest to lawfully act upon its cost-benefit analysis that paying Navas 
financial compensation for unlawful dismissal was more cost effective than 
filling her position with temporary workers until her health allowed her to 
return to work.  
Had Spanish law been Navas‘ only source of rights, the Madrid 
tribunal would have had to conclude its analysis at this step and hold that 
financial compensation was the only remedy for her unlawful dismissal.  
However, Navas was also a citizen of the European Union and her legal 
heritage includes, in case such as this, rights granted under Community 
law.148  As both a domestic and a Community court, the national tribunal 
must adjudicate cases under the laws of both legal orders.149  If illness is an 
enumerated ground for unlawful employment dismissals under Community 
law, or if disability discrimination under Community law protects 
employees dismissed on the basis of their illness, then Navas‘ dismissal 
would be reclassified as void.  Recognizing her right to be reinstated in her 
position would thus invalidate the legal effects of her employer‘s cost-
benefit analysis about how to fill her position while she was ill at home.  
The national court sent a preliminary reference to the European Court of 
 
 146. Id. ¶ 19. 
 147. Id. ¶ 20.  
 148. See Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen 1963 ECR 1, ¶ 3.  
 149. See Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA, 
1978 E.C.R. 629; Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de 
Alimentacion SA, 1991 ECR I-4135.  
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Justice asking for clarification of whether illness is a prohibited ground for 
discrimination under the Directive, either separately or implicitly, under 
disability.150
 
On the first question, the ECJ adopted a textualist stance and found that 
illness – or ―sickness,‖ as the Court called it – is not explicitly mentioned as 
a distinct, prohibited ground either in the text of the Directive or in Article 
13 EC, which constituted the general antidiscrimination provision and the 
Directive‘s legal basis.151  The more difficult question is whether primary or 
secondary Community legislation prohibits implicit discrimination based on 
illness as part of disability discrimination.  In the Court‘s opinion, the 
answer to that question depends on the definition of disability in 
Community law, specifically in the context of employment and occupation.  
However, neither the Directive nor the EC Treaty defines the concept of 
disability.152  Nevertheless, the European Court of Justice saw in the lack of 
a definition a gap to be filled.  In a manner familiar to the student of its 
jurisprudence,153 the Court considered it incumbent upon itself to articulate 
―an autonomous and uniform interpretation‖ of the concept of disability.154  
It proceeded to define disability as ―a limitation which results in particular 
from physical, mental or psychological impairments and which hinders the 
participation of the person concerned in professional life.‖155 
This definition is surprising in a number of ways. First, it is strikingly 
reminiscent of the medical model, which the Community had explicitly 
rejected in 1996.156  Even a cursory foray into the political origins of the 
Framework Directive would have unveiled the social model, which 
conceptualizes disability as the effect of societal discrimination, not the 
individual‘s medical condition.  One would have reasonably expected—
 
 150. See Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 151. See id. ¶¶ 46–47, 54–55. 
 152. See Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16; Chacon Navas, 2006 
E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 39.  As the previous section speculated, this silence was likely not a 
legislative oversight.  See supra text accompanying notes 128–132. 
 153. See, e.g., Case 327/82, Ekro, 1984 ECR 107, ¶  11; Case C-323/03 Commission 
v. Spain, 2006 ECR I-0000, ¶ 32.  
 154. Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 40, 42 (reasoning that this ―follows from 
the need for uniform application of Community law and the principle of equality‖).  
 155. Id. ¶ 43. The Court here followed Advocate General Geelhoed, who defined 
persons with disability, within the meaning of the directive, as persons with ―serious 
functional limitations (disabilities) due to physical, psychological or mental afflictions.‖ 
Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Case C-13/05, Chacon Navas v. Eurest 
Colectividades SA, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 76.  The act of discrimination is a reaction to 
the social effects of the medical condition, and it is severable from it: ―the health 
problem as cause of the functional limitation should in principle be distinguished from 
that limitation.‖ Id. ¶ 77. 
 156. See 1996 EC Disability Strategy, supra note 54.  The court relied on the 
definition of disability set out by the World Health Organization‘s International 
Classification of Functioning, Disability, and Health.  According to the court, this 
definition provides that ―‗disability‘ is a generic term that includes defects, limitations of 
activity, and restriction of participation in social life.  Sickness is capable of causing 
defects which disable individuals.‖  Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 22. 
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indeed, commentators did expect157—that the definition of disability would 
reflect legislative intent.  Instead, the Court assumes that medical 
impairments themselves, not the work environment, hinder professional life.  
Both stakeholders and academics reacted with surprise to the Court‘s 
narrow definition of disability.  Scholars pointed out that the Court‘s 
definition is the same as the individual/medical model of disability,158 and 
some of them have gone as far as to argue that this particular definition puts 
Community legislation at odds with the Community‘s commitments as a 
signatory of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities.159  The disability rights movement, which played a critical role 
in pushing the disability agenda to the forefront of Community politics, also 
reacted forcefully to the definition.160  Shortly after the Navas judgment was 
announced, the European Disability Forum demanded the adoption of a 
comprehensive disability directive that would ―provide guidance, based on 
the social model of disability, on when the person shall be regarded as 
disabled for the purposes of the directive.‖161 
Second, the definition is surprising because neither it nor the opinion of 
the Court distinguishes among different kinds of medical impairments.  
Although the Court explicitly rejects the argument that the Directive 
protects an employee as soon as he develops ―any type of sickness,‖162 there 
are important differences between i) medical conditions that are ―transitory 
 
 157. See Katie Wells, supra note 128, at 261 (―There is nothing in the Directive or 
other Community materials that supports a definition of disability which limits the scope 
of the Directive to considerations of medical impairment rather than disability in a wide 
social sense.‖).  
 158. Both defining elements of the individual model are present in the Court‘s 
definition: first, the location of the problem of disability within the individual, and 
second, an understanding of disability stemming from ―the functional limitations and 
psychological losses which are assumed to arise from disability.‖ OLIVER, 
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 11, at 32. 
 159. See Lisa Waddington, Case C-13/05, Chacon Navas v. Eurest Colectividades 
SA, judgment of the Grand Chamber of 11 July 2006, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 487 
(2007).  But see Waddington, supra note 9, at 18 (noting that the Commission does not 
share the opinion that the Court was out of line with the Convention).  Interestingly, one 
of the most recent official documents from the Commission glosses over the Court‘s 
definition by stating that ―[t]here is no EU-wide definition of disability.‖  See 
Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Commission Communication: 
European Disability Strategy 2010-2020, at  4, SEC (2010) 1323 final (Nov. 15, 2010).  
The document then mentions the definition of disability included in the UN Convention.  
See id. 
 160. See, e.g., European Disability Forum, Proposal by the European Disability 
Forum for a Comprehensive Directive to Combat Discrimination Against Persons with 
Disabilities 7 (2008) (―The Court showed a lack of understanding of the social model 
and relied in an out-dated medical approach in developing a definition for the purposes 
of the Directive.‖) http://cms.horus.be/files/99909/MediaArchive/library 
/Disability%20Specific%20Directive.doc. 
 161. See European Disability Forum, EDF Absolute Demands on the Future Non-
discrimination Directive, http://www.edf-feph.org/Page_Generale.asp?DocID=18330 
(―The Directive must provide guidance, based on the social model of disability, on when 
the person shall be regarded as disabled for the purposes of the directive.‖). 
 162. See Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 46.  
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and minor,‖163 ii) conditions such as cancer, MS, or depression, whose long-
term effect is known from the moment when they are diagnosed; iii) 
medical conditions that can develop into long-term illness.164 Moreover, 
some illnesses (heart disease, diabetes, asthma, depression) have long-term 
effects so debilitating that, while the impairment itself might not be similar 
in nature to that of deafness or muscular dystrophy, it leads to comparable 
social disadvantages.165  In any event, surprising in the Court‘s failure to 
fine-tune the legal analysis is not its unawareness of these distinctions, but 
the implicit—read, unjustified—refusal to deem the distinctions relevant.166  
Such distinctions certainly did not look irrelevant in Navas‘ case.  Although 
the record did not contain details regarding the plaintiff‘s medical condition, 
the Court nevertheless had sufficient evidence to conclude that her illness 
was not minor, and that it had lasted far too long to be labeled transitory.  
Chronic illness, temporary disability, and other such categories blur the 
lines between illness, impairment, and disability in the Court‘s analysis and 
reveal its thin conceptual grounds. 
Finally, the definition is surprising because the Court‘s reasoning 
seems markedly uninformed by the historical, political, and normative 
debate regarding the meaning of disability in Europe and abroad.  Not once 
in the entire judgment does the Court so much as hint at the transformation 
of disability law from the medical to the social model.  As I have argued 
elsewhere, this type of legal analysis is the inescapable consequence of a 
collegial form of judgment.167  Allowing judges to enter separate and 
concurring opinions would bring about a discursive turn in the Court‘s 
 
 163. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 3, 122 Stat. 3553, 
3553 (2008) (One of the grounds of ―disability‖ is ―being regarded as having such an 
impairment (as described in paragraph (3)).‖  Id. (1)(C). ―Paragraph (1)(C) shall not 
apply to impairments that are transitory and minor. A transitory impairment is an 
impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.‖  Id. (3)(B)); see 
also Commission Communication: Towards a Barrier Free Europe for People with 
Disabilities, at 4, COM (2000) 284 final (May 12, 2000) (―People with disabilities do not 
constitute an homogeneous group and there is a broad range of disabilities and issues. 
Disabilities may be apparent or hidden, severe or mild, singular or multiple, chronic or 
intermittent.‖).   
 164. For this distinction, including specific examples, see European Disability Forum, 
EDF Analysis of the First Decision of the European Court of Justice on the Disability 
Provisions of the Framework Employment Directive 7 (2006).  
 165. See, e.g., World Health Organization, Diabetes Fact Sheet, 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs312/en/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (noting 
that diabetes and its complications ―impose significant economic consequences on 
individuals, families, health systems and countries‖). 
 166. To his credit, the Advocate General at least signaled—without offering 
solutions—the relevance of distinguishing among different kinds of medical 
impairments.  Opinion of Advoc. Gen., Navas, ¶ 63 (―One of the characteristics often 
referred to in the literature to distinguish disabilities from diseases is the permanence of 
the physical or mental defect.  In most cases there is indeed a sound basis.  However, 
there are progressive diseases entailing serious and long-lasting losses of function which 
impede the functioning of patients so badly that they do not differ significantly in society 
from ‗permanently‘ disabled people.‖). 
 167. See Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49 VA. 
J. INT‘L L. 307, 367 (2009).  
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jurisprudence, rendering its judicial reasoning more transparent and perhaps 
even deepening it.  For instance, one effect might have been to limit the 
holding.  Even assuming the Court‘s intention to reject the view of the 
referring court that ―a worker should . . . be protected [as disabled] as soon 
as the sickness is established,‖168 which indeed many social advocates 
would also oppose, it does not follow that the Court should have adopted a 
far-reaching, impairment-centered definition of disability.  However, despite 
the fact that the final judgment does not contain any traces of disagreement 
about different interpretations of disability, it would be unwarranted to 
assume that the array of approaches and concerns laid out by American 
courts do not apply in the European context.169  
It is often remarked that American courts pay no heed to the 
jurisprudence of their foreign counterparts.  But a similar phenomenon is 
overlooked when the culprit is a foreign court, including supranational 
courts such as the ECJ.  Had the ECJ looked at American litigation of the 
ADA, either of its own initiative or at the invitation of the Advocate General 
(―AG‖), the Commission, or the parties, it might have learned important 
lessons about the risks involved in not only defining disability narrowly, but 
also, and perhaps more importantly, in dwelling on the definition of the 
protected class in the first place.  The next section briefly sketches the 
American experience. 
B. The Definition of Disability in American Law 
Writing a decade after the Americans with Disabilities Act (―ADA‖) 
was enacted, Richard Scotch noted that ―the legal system [had] become the 
primary arena for challenges to the ADA‘s broad focus and underlying 
assumptions.‖170  This development is not entirely surprising in a society 
where most struggles for recognition eventually end up in courts.  More 
 
 168. See Opinion of Advoc. Gen., Navas, ¶ 27.  
 169. The judgment of the Navas court comes close to the medicalized approach to 
disability of UK courts.  Even if the UK DDA implements a medicalized approach, 
courts have gone out of their way to limit the rationae personae of the statute beyond 
what the medical model would have required.  For instance, judges have introduced a 
third category of physiologically-caused impairments alongside mental and physical 
impairments, which the DDA mentions explicitly. In cases involving plaintiffs with 
physical impairments, such as shoulder injuries, neck and spine injuries, and severe back 
pain, that had no identifiable physical cause but certifiable effects, courts considered the 
physiological nature of the impairment and denied plaintiffs DDA coverage on the 
ground the impairments lacked a ―clinically well recognized‖ diagnostic.  See Rugamer 
v. Sony Music Entertainment UK Ltd, [2001] IRLR 644; McNicol v. Balfour Beatty Rail 
Maintenance Ltd [2002] ICR 381 (EAT).  ―[S]hort of satisfactory medical evidence of a 
diagnosed or diagnosable clinical condition or other mental disorder of a recognizable 
type, evidence simply of a restriction of a person‘s level of function or activity 
accompanied by a general suggestion that this is (or may be) a manifestation of some 
psychological state will not meet the statutory threshold for establishing mental 
impairment.‖ Id. ¶ 45.  Of course, to the extent that physical and mental impairments 
require medical diagnosis, disability cases involve complex questions of fact whose 
determination at the trial level is likely to be upheld on appeal.  On this point, see Wells, 
supra note 128, at 256. 
 170. Scotch, Models, supra note 3, at 213. 
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striking, however, is the dramatically one-sided effect of courts in the 
direction of limiting the ADA‘s reach and undermining its ambition.  A 
study from 1998 found employer-defendants winning in 92 percent of cases 
under the ADA.171  Many of these cases ended at the summary judgment 
stage after courts found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the statutory 
definition of disability.172  Since earlier studies show plaintiffs winning in 
about one-third of all ADA cases that got to the jury or the judge on a bench 
trial,173 one gets a better sense of how many suits were terminated at the 
summary judgment stage.  Scholars have referred to this combination of a 
narrow definition of disability and the use of summary judgments as a 
―powerful one-two punch.‖174  This section describes briefly the first jab, so 
to speak, namely the definition of disability.  
The ADA defines ―disability‖ as (a) a physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such 
individual, or (b) a record of such an impairment, or (c) being regarded as 
having such an impairment.175  This definition was almost identical to the 
definition of ―handicap‖ in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; 
Congress was legislating against the backdrop of courts adopting a broad 
view of the definition of ―handicap‖ in Section 504 litigation.176  Stated 
retrospectively, on the occasion of the 2008 ADA, while Congress 
―expected that the definition of disability under the ADA would be 
interpreted consistently with how courts had applied the definition of the 
handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that 
expectation [had] not been fulfilled.‖177  What happened? 
The short answer is that, instead of continuing their earlier practice of 
interpreting broadly the protected class of persons with disabilities, judges 
reached for the magnifying glass and began scrutinizing the different 
components of the definition of disability.  After years of litigation in lower 
courts, cases made their way up to the Supreme Court in the later 1990s.178  
The Court started developing from the top down an intricate jurisprudence 
 
 171. Am. Bar Ass‘n, supra note 27. 
 172. See COLKER, supra note 79, at 96; see also id. at 78(noting a trend over time for 
more employment discrimination cases, not just ADA cases, to be decided by summary 
devices rather than by completed trials). 
 173. Id. at 71. 
 174. Id. at 115.  
 175. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). 
 176. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 93. 
 177. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553 § 2, (a)(3) 
(2008).  
 178. See Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative 
Capability, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1279 (2000) (analyzing the six ADA decisions during the 
1998 Term, which involved statutory interpretation).  Earlier, the Supreme Court had 
refused to recognize mental disability as a suspect class.  See City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).  For a discussion of Cleburne as well 
as other Supreme Court equal protection cases, from the perspective of the minority 
group model, see Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or 
Biased Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. LAB. L. 166, 182–191 (2000).  
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on the meaning of ―physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more of the major life activities,‖ as well as on the ―regarded as‖ 
prong of the statutory definition.179  The net result has been a shift away 
from litigation over the content of the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation,180 coupled with a narrow interpretation of the protected 
class, which resulted in denial of protection to many plaintiffs who would 
have been covered under the 1973 Act.  As Congress noted retrospectively 
in 2008, this created an ―inappropriately high level of limitation necessary 
to obtain coverage under the ADA.‖181 
A landmark case from 1999, Sutton v. United Airlines,182 exemplifies 
the judiciary‘s approach.  That case involved a challenge to United Airlines‘ 
minimum vision requirement for global pilots.  The plaintiffs, two seriously 
myopic twin sisters whose visual acuity was 20/200 or worse, challenged as 
discriminatory under the ADA the airline‘s refusal to hire them on the 
ground that they failed to meet a minimum requirement of uncorrected 
visual acuity of 20/100 or better.183  Although eyeglasses or contact lenses 
entirely corrected the sisters‘ vision, the plaintiffs argued that, left 
uncorrected, their visual impairments substantially limited a major life 
activity, namely work.  In the Court‘s view, the case raised the question of 
whether corrective measures, such as assistive or prosthetic devices, should 
be taken into consideration in determining whether a plaintiff is disabled 
within the meaning of the ADA.  Unlike under the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, where the courts would have considered the plaintiffs disabled and 
then proceeded to determine whether they had been the subject of 
discrimination, the Sutton court dwelled on the question of whether the 
plaintiffs met the statutory requirements of disability.184  Here, in order for 
the Court to advance to the discrimination analysis, the court would need to 
determine that corrective measures that mitigate an individual‘s impairment 
should not be taken into consideration in determining whether that 
individual is disabled under the ADA, as the implementation guidelines of 
the EEOC suggested.  
The Court disagreed with the EEOC guidelines and held that corrective 
measures ought to be taken into consideration.185  Put differently, only those 
 
 179. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (holding that asymptomatic HIV 
infection constitutes a disability under the ADA).  For a review of the early cases on the 
―regarded as‖ prong, see generally Risa M. Mish, “Regarded as Disabled” under the 
ADA: Safety Net or Catch-All ?, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 159 (1998).  
 180. See Diller, supra note 25, at 25 (―The problem is not that the courts view all 
accommodations as ―unreasonable‖ or ―undue burdens‖ on employers, but that they 
rarely even get to the point of reaching such issues.‖).  
 181. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553, 3554 § 2 
(b)(5) (2008).  
 182. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).  In a companion case, the Court had to decide whether 
blood pressure controlled by medication constituted a disability within the meaning of 
the ADA.  See Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
 183. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475. 
 184. See id. at 481–94. 
 185. See id. at 482. 
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plaintiffs whose use of corrective measures does not mitigate the effect of 
their medical impairment, and whose impairment is substantially limiting as 
to one or more of the major life activities, are considered disabled.  
Dismissing in no uncertain terms the relevance of congressional purpose 
that the Act should cover the use of corrective measures,186 the Court 
adopted a textualist method of interpretation.187  Specifically, the Justices 
pointed out the use of the present indicative verb form in the definition of 
disability as an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, and 
interpreted it as a need that a person be substantially limited at present by 
the impairment.188  Moreover, examining impairments in their uncorrected 
state would bring within ADA coverage a number far beyond the 43 million 
Americans that Congress mentioned in the ADA‘s preamble.189  The need 
for an individualized assessment is itself interpreted as mandated by the 
text, specifically the mention of ―such individual‖ in the statutory definition 
of disability.190 In addition to clarifying the  first, ―substantially limits,‖ 
definition of disability, the Sutton Court interpreted other parts of the 
definition of disability.191  For instance, the court rejected the plaintiffs‘ 
claim that poor vision affected their capacity to ―work‖ as a major life 
 
 186. Id. (―Justice Stevens relies on the legislative history of the ADA for the contrary 
proposition that individuals should be examined in their uncorrected state.  Because we 
decide that, by its terms, the ADA cannot be read in this manner, we have no reason to 
consider the ADA‘s legislative history.‖). 
 187. The literature on textualism in American law is extensive.  See generally John F. 
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005); Caleb Nelson, 
What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005). 
 188. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482. 
 189. See id. at 487 (―Had Congress intended to include all persons with corrected 
physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a 
much higher number of disabled persons in the findings.‖).  For instance, in the case of 
corrected vision alone, that figure would be higher than 100 million. See Feldblum, 
supra note 18, at 153–154.  
 190. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482. ―The use or nonuse of a corrective device does not 
determine whether an individual is disabled; that determination depends on whether the 
limitations an individual with an impairment actually faces are in fact substantially 
limiting.‖ Id. at 488.  The requirement of an individualized approach has become a 
landmark of the court‘s jurisprudence in this area.  See Albertson‘s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 
527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999) (mentioning a ―statutory obligation to determine the existence 
of disabilities on a case-by-case basis.‖); see also Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc., 534 U.S.  
at 198 (holding that the determination of the existence of disability should be made in a 
―case-by-case manner‖ through ―[a]n individualized assessment of the effect of an 
impairment . . . .‖).  The Court has, however, mentioned that ―some impairments may 
invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity.‖ See Albertson‟s, Inc., 
527 U.S. at 556.  
 191. For instance, the court interpreted the ―regarded as‖ prong of the definition of 
disability.  See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489 (―There are two apparent ways in which 
individuals can fall within this statutory definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly 
believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, non-
limiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.‖) The court 
then pointed out that this prong applies to protect persons with disabilities from 
stereotypic assumptions based on myths and fears about disability.  Id. 
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activity within the meaning of the statute.192  The plaintiffs‘ ability to work 
as global airline pilots had been affected; however, their skills qualified 
them for other positions, such as regional pilot or pilot instructor.  This line 
of argument makes apparent the consequences in the definitional shift that 
represents a novelty in ADA adjudication compared to the 1973 
Rehabilitation Act.  Assuming that the discrimination—not the 
conceptual/definitional analysis—was the center of gravity of the legal 
analysis, fears of either diluting the protection afforded to persons with 
disabilities or of increased litigation would be unwarranted.  As the 
dissenters in Sutton point out, vision is important to airline pilots, but it is 
not nearly as important to most other employers.193  Plaintiffs that would try 
to benefit from abusively enlarging the protected class under the ADA 
would be easily filtered out at the discrimination stage of the analysis.194  
However, that later stage of the analysis is seldom reached when litigation 
focuses on the conceptual issue of the definition of disability. 
The ascendency of Sutton‘s conceptualist approach led to some bizarre 
results in subsequent cases.195  Scholars documented how, between 1995 
and 1996, from a total of 110 cases decided on the definition of disability, 
only one plaintiff out of six met the statutory definition.196  Impairments 
such as epilepsy, cancer, and diabetes were not recognized as covered.  The 
1999 Supreme Court cases in a sense ratified this development of the 
jurisprudence.  Narrow statutory construction of concepts such as ―major 
activity‖ and ―substantial limitations‖ meant that individuals with 
impairments among the most serious (breast cancer, MS, lymphoma, brain 
tumors, hemophilia, epilepsy, and depression197) might not qualify for ADA 
protection.  Meeting the definition of disability became especially 
burdensome on plaintiffs and explains why many failed in the courts.198  As 
one commentator noted with appropriate sarcasm, ―despite the enormity of 
[the figure mentioned in the ADA preamble], the court decisions suggest 
that the people who choose to sue under the ADA are seldom among this 
group.‖199 
This trend of narrowing the definition of disability, and by 
consequence, the class of individuals protected from discrimination, 
continued in future cases.  In Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, the 
 
 192. See id. at 492. 
 193. See id. at 510 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 194. See id. 
 195. The scholarly literature has faulted the Sutton court for both logical and 
normative flaws in the reasoning.  See COLKER, supra note 79, at 105 (interpreting 
Sutton as instructing courts to ―determine if the plaintiffs were disabled in their corrected 
state, despite the fact that the employer insisted that they take the test in the uncorrected 
state.‖). 
 196. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 139. 
 197. See Diller, supra note 25, at 26. 
 198. See id. at 28 (―[ADA] cases require plaintiffs to amass a wealth of demographic 
and economic data, potentially turning individual ADA cases into battles of labor market 
experts.‖). 
 199. Id. at 26.  
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Court expanded further on the meaning of ―substantial limitation‖ of a 
major life activity, as well as on the meaning of ―major life activity.‖200  The 
case raised the question of whether the plaintiff-worker‘s carpal tunnel 
syndrome and other conditions involving her wrists, elbows, and shoulders 
substantially limited her in the major life activity of performing manual 
tasks at the Toyota facility where she was an employee.201 As to the 
methodology, Justice O‘Connor wrote, for a unanimous court, that it was 
―guided first and foremost by the words of the definition of disability 
itself.‖202  The court found that an impairment ―substantially limits‖ a major 
life activity when it limits it ―to a large degree‖ or ―considerabl[y]‖ in terms 
of nature, severity and duration.203  Regarding the meaning of ―major life 
activity‖ itself, it referred, in the Court‘s interpretation, to activities that are 
of central importance to daily life.204  Thus, ―to be substantially limited in 
performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that 
prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of 
central importance to most people‘s daily lives.‖205  Since repetitive work 
with hands and arms extended at or above the shoulder for extended periods 
of time is not an important part of most people‘s daily lives, the plaintiff 
was not included in the protected class under the ADA.206 That a plaintiff 
suffering from medical conditions such as carpal tunnel syndrome, 
myotendinitis, and thoracic outlet compression would not be recognized as 
disabled under the ADA explains why the Court‘s narrow definition was 
meant expressly to ―create . . . demanding standard[s] for qualifying as 
disabled.‖207 
An alternative approach would have been to interpret the concept of 
disability broadly and shift the bulk of the legal analysis to the question of 
discrimination.208  Instead, the court channeled more of its interpretative 
energy towards the definitional question. It looked specifically at the 
medical impairment—and even then, it did not ask the question of the 
impairment‘s social effects, but rather turned to issues such as: ―the nature 
and severity of the impairment; the duration or expected duration of the 
impairment; the permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent 
or long-term impact of or resulting from the impairment.‖209  In the 2008 
 
 200. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at 196–97. 
 201. See id. at 196. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 197. 
 205. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at 198. 
 206. See id. at 201. 
 207. Id. at 197.  
 208. The focus on the definitional stage is part of a larger approach to rights in 
American law.  The resistance of American constitutional law to the proportionality 
method is one example.  See generally Mattias Kumm, Constitutional Rights as 
Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional Justice, 2 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 
574 (2003). 
 209. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(2)(listing factors that should be considered 
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ADAAA, Congress rejected the judicial narrowing of ―the broad scope of 
protection intended to be afforded to the ADA, thus eliminating protection 
for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect.‖210  However, 
without a deeper understanding of the root causes of the courts‘ approach, 
Congress‘ action is a mere reprimand that will unlikely lead to the desired 
results. Uprooting the backlash depends on answers to questions such as: 
why is the impairment-centered approach to disability so appealing; why 
can‘t courts break away; and, why do they remain tied to the medicalized 
understanding of disability, despite the legislative shift away from it?  
III. Explaining the Resilence of the Medicialized Model in Judicial 
Definitions of Disability 
Part III identifies explanations offered for the medicalized, narrow 
interpretations of disability in the American context and asks if they help in 
understanding the comparable approach of European courts.  The 
explanations are divided into two categories.  Among explanations 
endogenous to legal reasoning, the first section discusses doctrinal, 
interpretative, and jurisprudential explanations.  In the second group are 
explanations exogenous to law, understood quasi-autonomously.  The 
explanations in this second group find the causes of the conceptual turn 
outside of law and legal doctrine, specifically in the composition of the 
judiciary, in its ideological commitments, or in the institutional tensions 
between courts and legislators.  Because I do not believe in a strict approach 
to law‘s autonomy, the distinction between endogenous and exogenous 
explanations aims solely to bring structure and clarity to the analysis.  Any 
account of the judiciary‘s definitional work in this area will draw on both 
types of explanations.  My aim in this section is to show that at least in the 
European context, these accounts are insufficient, taken both severally and 
together.  In the next section I offer an additional explanation for the staying 
power of the medicalized approach to disability in judicial definitions of 
disability that applies to Europe and might also enhance the understanding 
of the comparable phenomenon in the United States.   
As a caveat before we proceed, it is important to recall that there are 
important differences between the American and the European contexts.  
The textual starting point of judicial interpretation is different.  American 
courts interpreted the ADA‘s statutory definition of disability, whereas the 
Community Directive included no specific definition.  Moreover, the 
American experience with the ADA has been ongoing for almost two 
decades, in contrast to the European experience at the supranational level.  
Differences in the number of disability cases can be explained by reference 
 
in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity).   
 210. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553, 3553 § 2 
(a)(4) (2008).  In the 2008 ADA Amendments Act, Congress explicitly overruled Sutton 
and Toyota.  With respect to Sutton, it rejected ―the requirement that . . . whether an 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with reference to 
the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures.‖  Id. (b)(2). 
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to the relatively short period that has passed since the deadline for the 
implementation of the Framework Directive.  These differences are also 
related to the distinct positions that the ECJ and the US Supreme Court 
occupy in their respective jurisdictions.  Thus, the analysis in this section is 
by necessity provisional in character.  It is too early now for a 
comprehensive analysis of the impact that Chacon Navas will have in the 
national laws of the member states.  We do know that it led to the rejection 
of Ms. Chacón Navas‘ own claim by the referring court.211  While there are 
decisions of national courts that have cited to different aspects of the Navas 
opinion,212 a comprehensive impact study would be premature.  
A. Endogenous Explanations 
This section analyzes doctrinal, interpretative, and jurisprudential 
explanations of the resilience of the medicalized approach in judicial 
definitions of disability.  
1. Doctrinal Explanations: The Illusion of Retrospective Determinism 
It is sometimes argued that plaintiffs lose under the ADA because their 
claims are weak under the law.213  They either fail to prove that they are 
―disabled‖ within the meaning of the ADA, or, when they have standing, 
they cannot convince courts that employers owe them a duty to provide 
reasonable accommodation for their disability.214  By itself, this doctrinal 
explanation—which sounds more like a description of judicial holdings than 
an explanation—is an instance of what the French philosopher Henry 
Bergson called ―the illusion of retrospective determinism.‖215  Like all 
doctrinal explanations, this account is self-evident to the extent that the 
losing party will have, retrospectively and from a formal juridical 
standpoint, the weaker legal claim.  But this explanation ignores the 
doctrinal hurdles imposed on plaintiffs by courts interpreting the ADA. For 
instance, such an account must explain why medical conditions such as 
hemophilia, cancer (active or in remission), or diabetes, which had been 
covered under the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, were deemed by courts to fail to 
meet the statutory definition of disability under the ADA, considering that 
the definition had been transposed from the 1973 Act.216  The rates at which 
 
 211. See S. Juz. Soc.,Oct. 16, 2006 (No. 363) (Spain). 
 212. See Paterson v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (EAT (UK)), [2007] 
I.C.R. 1522; Chief Constable of Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary v Adams 
(EAT(Sc)), [2009] ICR 1034 (UKEATS/46/08) (discussing the ―normal day-to-day 
activities‖ and ―professional life‖ prongs of the definition).  For a decision of the Irish 
Equality Tribunal where the ECJ‘s narrow interpretation was detrimental to the plaintiff 
alleging discrimination on the basis of disability, see DEC-E2010-045, Laurence 
O‘Rourke v. JJ Red Holdings Limited, ¶ 5.7.  
 213. See Diller, supra note 25, at 21. 
 214. See id. at 25. 
 215. TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, HISTORY OF THE PRESENT xix (2000) (quoting Henri 
Bergson). 
 216. See Diller, supra note 25, at 21 n.20.  
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plaintiffs lost under the ADA brings to the forefront the doctrinal hurdles—
especially regarding standing—that courts erected by narrowly interpreting 
the statutory definition of disability.  A doctrinal edifice built on a statutory 
provision, such as the statutory definition of disability, must by necessity be 
supplemented with an account of the method of interpretation that courts 
used in erecting that edifice.  And since no text interprets itself, the choice 
of the method of interpretation takes us beyond legal doctrine.  I will discuss 
that choice in the next section. 
The doctrinal explanation is harder to dismiss in the European context 
because neither primary nor secondary Community legislation included a 
definition of disability.  The ECJ filled that gap and stipulated an 
―autonomous and uniform application (of the Directive) throughout the 
Community.‖217  In the Court‘s view, allowing national jurisdictions to 
interpret the meaning of disability according to their national laws would 
result in a differential application of the Directive across the Union territory, 
and thus lead to disparate protection of persons suffering from similar 
disabilities.  At least prima facie, this is a sound, doctrinal explanation of the 
need for a definition of disability at the Community level. 
The real question is whether the Court had doctrinal reasons for 
choosing the particular impairment-centered definition of disability, instead 
of other available definitions.218  For instance, the ECJ explained that the 
legislature deliberately used ―disability‖ as opposed to ―sickness,‖ and 
hence ―the two concepts cannot . . . simply be treated as being the same.‖219  
But there are a number of possible definitions that do not conflate disability 
with ―any type of sickness.‖220  The Court also noted that the Directive 
mandates employers to provide reasonable accommodation for their 
disabled employees, while at the same time making explicit that the duty is 
not owed to employees that cannot perform the essential functions of the 
position.221  Yet it hardly follows that an employee who misses work cannot 
perform the essential functions of the position. For instance, the essential 
functions of a job might not require a fixed schedule.  An atypical work 
schedule is not tantamount to ―missing work,‖ but rather, it can represent 
accommodation in the form of a ―flexible schedule.‖  
There are situations—including Navas‘ situation itself, where at least 
some scenarios could not be ruled out given the limited information that 
courts had about her condition—where the employees might suffer from an 
illness ―capable of causing defects which disable individuals.‖222  Disability 
 
 217. Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 40.  
 218. See Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 22; World Health Organization, 
International Classification of Functioning, Disability, and Health (2001) (defining 
disability as ―the negative aspect of the interaction between an individual (with a health 
condition) and that individual‘s contextual factors (personal and environmental 
factors)‖).  
 219. Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 44.  
 220. See infra section 4.1. 
 221. Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 49. 
 222. Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 22. 
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often occurs during adulthood and often causes disruption in physical, 
mental, sensory, or intellectual functions, which in turn cause people to miss 
work. An employee, like Navas, who becomes disabled while employed, 
will presumably have to miss a substantial amount of work for disability-
related reasons.  During that period in which the disability might not yet be 
fully realized, such a person is not (or not-yet) disabled, but ill.  The result 
of denying persons in this category the remedy of reinstatement, when their 
medical impairments are the reasons for their dismissal, would lead to the 
bizarre conclusion that a person would be better off becoming impaired 
while unemployed, since that eliminates the social and psychological burden 
of being fired from a job where one could expect to return.  There are thus 
doctrinal reasons why, as the Madrid Tribunal argued in its reference to the 
ECJ in Navas, ―a worker should be protected as soon as sickness is 
established.‖223 
I do not mean to take a stand—at least not yet—on whether those are 
good doctrinal arguments.  The doctrinal solution of the ECJ in Navas rests 
on theoretical premises about a continuum between impairment and 
disability.  Some social actors share these normative assumptions.  For 
instance, the European Disability Forum took the same position, arguing 
that the difference between disability and illness is quantitative, and that any 
illness that has long-term effects (such as heart disease, diabetes, asthma, 
depression) constitutes a disability.224  However, there are strong arguments, 
some from within the disability movement, to oppose the continuum 
approach. Others argue, for reasons I will discuss in Part IV, in favor of a 
binary approach to illness and disability.  As a consequence, they generally 
support the holding in Navas and the American approach that the ADA ―is 
not a general protection of medically afflicted persons . . .  [if] the employer 
discriminates against them on account of their being (or being believed by 
him to be) ill, even permanently ill, but not disabled, there is no 
violation.‖225  But the point here is that doctrine is only the consequence of a 
larger theoretical standpoint about the relationship between disability, 
impairment, illness, and discrimination.  The doctrinal explanation is 
insufficient because the doctrinal solutions themselves are not free standing.  
2. Methods of Interpretation: Textualism 
The U.S. Supreme Court used textualism as its method of choice in 
interpreting the ADA and especially the statutory definition of disability.  
Textualism here refers to a method of interpreting the statutory definition of 
disability literally, without attention either to its purpose or to legislative 
 
 223. Opinion of Advoc. Gen. Geelhoed, Navas, 27.  
 224. European Disability Forum, EDF Analysis, supra note 164, at 8.  
 225. Christian v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th Cir. 1997); 
see also Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming judgment for 
the employer where plaintiff was disqualified from being a firefighter based on his 
hemophilia because hemophilia is not a disability per se, and the field of firefighting jobs 
was so narrow that plaintiff was not substantially limited in the major life activity of 
working). 
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history.  As Justice O‘Connor wrote in Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. 
Williams, for a unanimous Court, the Court‘s inquiry is ―guided first and 
foremost by the words of the definition of disability itself.‖226  As we saw, 
the Court decided cases by focusing on the present indicative verb form in 
the definition of disability (as an impairment that substantially limits a 
major life activity),227 the figure of 43 million persons with disabilities 
included in the ADA‘s preamble, and the constitutive elements of disability: 
impairment that ―substantially limits‖ a ―major life activity.‖228  The Court 
declined to look beyond the words to their origin and purpose, or to the 
larger political and legal context in which the definition was enacted.  Many 
commentators have been surprised by the judicial turn to textualism, 
especially given that courts had broadly interpreted the almost identical 
1973 Rehabilitation Act definition of ―handicapped persons,‖ rarely pausing 
over it, and accordingly, over the contours of the protected class. Congress 
expressed a similar surprise when it amended the ADA in 2008.229  
However, from the Court‘s perspective, the gap between legislative 
intention and statutory text should not be blamed on the interpreter.  
Although it remains an open question of legislative craft whether laws can 
be so worded to reflect perfectly the legislative intent, Justice O‘Connor 
chastised the drafters of the ADA precisely for failing to express their 
intentions accurately.230  In any event, it is apparent that the choice of 
textualism was made at the expense of methods that would have given 
weight to legislative intent.  Even so, however, the words of the definition 
of disability could have been interpreted narrowly or broadly.  Thus, the 
Court‘s choice of a narrow textualist interpretation must also be 
explained.231   
Reference to textualism needs to be even more nuanced when applied 
to the ECJ‘s decision in Navas.  The Framework Directive did not contain a 
definition that the Court could interpret. However, the Court did rely on a 
textualist (and generally non-purposivist) method, which it combined with 
purposivist and selective historical methods of interpretation.232  
 
 226. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at 196. 
 227. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.  
 228. See id. at 487. 
 229. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553 § 2, 
(a)(3) (2008) (―While Congress expected that the definition of disability under the ADA 
would be interpreted consistently with how courts had applied the definition of a 
handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that expectation has not 
been fulfilled.‖).    
 230. The question of Congressional intent is complex.  The ADA‘s over-reliance on 
litigation is notable, by contrast to alternative institutional strategies, such as the creation 
of an agency, as a means for addressing deep-rooted discrimination against persons with 
disabilities.  I am thankful to Richard Stewart for discussion on this point.  But see 
COLKER, supra note 79, at 4 (―The problem with the ADA‘s failed promises . . . largely 
lies with the Supreme Court rather than Congress‘s basic framework in enacting the 
ADA.‖). 
 231. But see Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992 (2008).  
 232. See generally Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467. 
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The reader will recall that the preliminary reference in Navas was 
twofold: first, the referring court asked the ECJ whether illness is included 
as part of disability; second, should the court answer the first question in the 
negative, the referring court asked if illness constituted a separately 
prohibited ground.233  Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the ECJ did not inquire 
into the legislative process that had produced the Directive.  As we saw in 
Part I, the Directive had been the culmination of the Community‘s policy 
shift from the mid-1990s toward a social model of disability; we also saw 
that legislative history would conflict with the narrow definition that the 
Court adopted in the decision.  Nevertheless, legislative history was not 
entirely absent from the Court‘s opinion if we expand its framework of 
authority to include the Opinion of the Advocate General (―AG‖) Geelhoed, 
whose conclusions on this matter the Court could be read as endorsing.  AG 
Geelhoed treats legislative history in a selective—one might say 
strategically selective—fashion.  Specifically, his analysis papers over the 
legislative history of the Framework Directive but dwells at length on ―the 
restraint shown by the authors of the Treaty‖ in then-Article 13 EC, which 
the Directive‘s recitals mention as its legal basis.234  In his interpretation, the 
history of the article justifies a narrow, literal interpretation.  Per a contrario, 
an expansive interpretation would disrupt the fragile equilibrium between 
the Community and the Member States that underlined the negotiations for 
then-Article 13.  The equilibrium is reflected in the text of the provision: it 
provides a legal basis only for ―appropriate action‖; the enumeration of 
prohibited grounds is exhaustive;235 its subsidiary nature; and the express 
mention of the limits on the Community‘s powers.236  In AG Geelhoed‘s 
view, a broad interpretation of disability, one that would for instance 
encompass illness, risks making then-Article 13 an all-purpose tool in the 
hands of the Community, thus undermining the sovereignty of Member 
States in areas such as health care policy and social security where the 
Treaty guarantees their sovereignty.237 Legislative history is thus invoked 
here to justify a narrow, textualist method of interpretation.  The very choice 
of the textualist method answers the first question of the referring court 
about whether illness is part of disability.  The second question, whether 
illness can be interpreted as a separate ground, in a sense answers itself.  By 
labeling the enumeration of prohibited grounds in the provision as 
exhaustive and interpreting it literally, the Court made all but unavoidable 
the conclusion that illness is not a separately prohibited ground.238  
Following the logic of AG Geelhoed‘s argument, if the legislature had 
intended to include ―mere‖ illness among the protected grounds, it would 
have enumerated illness alongside other grounds. 
 
 233. See id. ¶ 25.  
 234. Opinion of Advoc. Gen., Chacon Navas, ¶ 46. 
 235. But see Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 115.  
 236. Opinion of Advoc. Gen., Chacon Navas, ¶ 47. 
 237. See Opinion of Advoc. Gen., Chacon Navas, ¶¶ 54, 56. 
 238. See Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 57. 
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The Court‘s (including AG Geelhoed‘s) narrow approach to then-
Article 13 is not baseless.  That provision was indeed the object of heated 
deliberations among Member States, some of which—for instance, the 
conservative U.K. government—were adamantly opposed to it.239  This 
history in part informed the Court‘s jurisprudence that denies then-Article 
13 direct effect. However, there are a few flaws in this narrow 
interpretation.  First, it is selective.  Once the center of gravity shifts from 
then-Article 13 to the Framework Directive itself, the Directive‘s own 
legislative history, as part of the new disability policy that had been adopted 
by the Community in 1996, suggests a very different interpretation.240  
Second, some of the ECJ‘s landmark interpretive strategies expose the false 
necessity in the literalist, narrow approach to then-Article 13.  Any student 
of European law familiar with the Court‘s teleological interpretation can 
state the form it would have taken in this case.  In line with its longstanding 
tradition, the Court would have pointed out that then-Article 13 was only an 
instantiation of the larger principle of equality, which demands that EU 
citizens be granted protection from discrimination across the EU territory.241  
The principle of nondiscrimination, as part of the larger principle of 
equality, would have been an available—and indeed plausible—hook for a 
teleological argument that would not have left Ms. Navas unprotected.242  
Finally, on the issue of illness as a separate ground, the Court‘s argument is 
weakened when put to a comparative test.  None of the comprehensive 
antidiscrimination provisions in the national constitutions of the Member 
States expressly mention illness among the prohibited grounds.  Thus, it is 
just as possible to conclude that illness is not mentioned expressly because it 
is implicitly protected as part of disability, as it is to say that is was not 
intended to be protected in the first place.  
3. Jurisprudential Explanations: Equality‟s Path-Dependency 
In the American context, scholars have at times explained the narrow 
judicial interpretation of disability as part of a ―judicial backlash‖ against 
the ADA, which itself was part of a larger backlash against the positive 
discrimination aspect of the jurisprudence of equality.243  Scholars have 
debated to what extent the struggle for recognition of persons with 
disabilities relies on a group model that borrows from the civil rights model 
not only in terms of rhetoric and political strategy, but also in terms of the 
 
 239. See EVELYN ELLIS, EU ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 13 n.59 (2005).  
 240. See de Búrca, supra note 104, at 219. 
 241. In fact, as we will see in the next section, the Court had relied on such an 
argument in an earlier preliminary reference concerning the meaning of the same 
directive.  See infra text accompanying notes 254–266. 
 242. The ECJ‘s recent equality jurisprudence indicates just such a broad approach. 
For an analysis, see Andrea Eriksson, European Court of Justice: Broadening the Scope 
of European Non-discrimination Law, 7 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 731, 733 (2009).  
 243. See Diller, supra note 25, at 39 (arguing that such claims came to courts at a 
time when they were ―decidedly inhospitable to expansive interpretations of civil rights 
protections in general‖). 
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jurisprudence of equality.  Disability claims for reasonable accommodation 
have sometimes been interpreted as tantamount to licenses for positive 
discrimination.244  Bereft of an objective basis on which to arbitrate 
competing rights arising from affirmative action claims, courts feared that 
their institutional legitimacy would diminish whenever they attempted to 
administer the ‗positive‘ aspects of the jurisprudence of race and gender 
equality.245  Courts used their familiar framework to conceptualize disability 
claims, and backlashed—preemptively—by limiting plaintiff standing. 
In light of these developments, it might be surprising to recall the hope 
of the ADA‘s initial supporters that the Act would breathe new life into the 
jurisprudence of equality by, for instance, making stigma an element of 
antidiscrimination analysis.246  For all the important scholarly work on 
disability discrimination and social structures,247 it seems clear now that the 
ADA has not only failed to transform equality jurisprudence, but that it has 
been a victim of the conceptual framework that some hoped it would 
change.  The connection between reasonable accommodation and positive 
discrimination helps to explain this state of affairs.  Claims that the former 
is an instance of the latter are debatable, and disability rights advocates have 
sought to dispel them.248 Although the formal ideal of equality, to treat like 
cases alike, is so entrenched as to have become almost intuitive, disability 
advocates have argued that equality also requires that different cases be 
treated alike when the difference is irrelevant in the eyes of the law.249  They 
conclude that a commitment to equality may at times require differential, as 
opposed to similar, treatment.250  However, the jurisprudential explanation 
 
 244. See Scotch, Models, supra note 3, at 222 (―In some ways, the concept [of 
affirmative action with respect to race] is analogous to the positive accommodations 
needed to make employment, education, public accommodations, and other institutional 
spheres truly accessible to Americans with disabilities.‖). 
 245. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1499 (2004). 
 246. Right after its adoption, many commentators had expressed the hope that the 
ADA‘s broad, structural approach to equality—whose ―regarded as‖ prong 
operationalized stigma—could itself shape equality jurisprudence in other 
nondiscrimination areas.  See Krieger, Foreword, supra note 71, at 6 (―The ADA 
promised to revive the concept of stigma as a powerful hermeneutic for the elaboration 
and judicial application of American civil rights law.‖).  
 247. See generally Elisabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State‟s Role in 
the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2009); Elisabeth F. Emens, 
Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839 (2008).  
 248. For an example from Europe, see Lisa Waddington, Case C-303/06, S. Coleman 
v. Attridge Law and Steve Law, judgment of the Grand Chamber of 17 July 2008, 46 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 665, 679 (2009) (―The use of the term ‗discrimination‘ in this 
context, albeit ‗positive discrimination,‘ implies that non-disabled people somehow lose 
out when the accommodation is provided to the disabled person, but that this loss is 
justified and therefore allowed.‖). 
 249. See Diller, supra note 25, at 23 (―The ADA‘s requirement of ‗reasonable 
accommodation‘ rests on the idea that in some circumstances people must be treated 
differently from others in order to be treated equally.‖). 
 250. See id. at 40 (―Many of the problems emerging from judicial decisions 
concerning the ADA stem from the ADA‘s reliance on a vision of equality that is 
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need not show that association between disability claims and positive 
discrimination is correct.  Rather it is sufficient to show that judges think it 
is correct and act accordingly.  The question thus becomes whether the 
equality-based explanation has an equivalent in the cases of the ECJ.  
Specifically, is the Court‘s impairment-centered definition of disability in 
Navas a reaction to the Court‘s own equality jurisprudence?  
Although it is difficult to find a perfect analogy with positive 
discrimination in the European context, the equality rationale does provide 
an equivalent to the jurisprudential explanation both at a general, 
institutional level as well as at the applied level of the jurisprudence of 
equality.  At the institutional level, the emphasis is on the ECJ‘s transition 
from its early assertive stance, when it acted as a propeller of the European 
project, towards a more minimalist approach.251  The institutional reading of 
the jurisprudential explanation seeks to illuminate the AG‘s rather subdued 
reference in Navas to the ―policy of equality‖ under then-Article 13 as an 
example of the Court‘s recalibrated institutional self-understanding.252  At 
the applied level of the jurisprudence of equality, the jurisprudential 
explanation points to the rather subdued equality analysis in Navas, 
explaining it as a backpedaling from the Court‘s latest antidiscrimination 
decisions, such as Mangold.253  
For all its ingenuity, the jurisprudential explanation fails to account for 
the turn to conceptualism in Navas.  Even assuming arguendo that the Court 
has entered a more moderate stage, where it does not reach by default to the 
teleological method in its interpretative toolkit, the narrow interpretation of 
disability is not part of that more moderate animus.  First, there is nothing 
moderate about the narrow judicial definition of disability.  Given the 
legislative history of the Framework Directive, the Court‘s interpretation 
represented a bold, radical departure from what all accounts indicate was the 
intended aim of the authors of the directive.  Second, and more importantly, 
the Court‘s subsequent interpretations of the disability provisions in the 
Framework Directive fail to support the judicial shift from bold teleology to 
strategic moderation.  Contrary to the claims of the jurisprudential 
explanation, Navas represents a departure from the Court‘s equality cases.  
That departure can be explained on grounds peculiar to disability.  
In Mangold, the Court held that ―the principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of age must . . . be regarded as a general principle of Community 
 
particularly controversial—the principle that differential treatment, rather than the same 
treatment, is necessary to create equality.‖).   
 251. See Eriksson, supra note 242242, at 753. 
 252. This approach departs from the adopted textualism insofar as it ignores the 
reference to the ―principle of equal treatment‖ in Article 1 of the Framework Directive.  
(―The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a general framework for combating 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as 
regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the Member 
States the principle of equal treatment.‖).  Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 12, art. 
1. 
 253. Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, 2005 E.C.R. I-09981.  
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law.‖254  To the disbelief (and excitement) of the academy,255 it noted that 
―the source of the actual principle underlying the prohibition‖ can be found 
in the ―various international instruments and the constitutional traditions of 
the Member States‖ and held that national courts have a duty to set aside 
national law that violates this principle, even before the period of 
implementation of a directive has expired.256  According to the 
jurisprudential explanation, the rather tepid commitment to equality in 
Navas is a reaction to these earlier statements. However, a subsequent 
preliminary reference under the Framework Directive undermines that 
argument.  
In Coleman, the ECJ answered a preliminary reference question from 
an employment tribunal in the UK to interpret whether the Framework 
Directive extends its protection to employees discriminated against on the 
basis of their association with a person with disability.257  Ms. Coleman 
claimed that her employer discriminated against her because of her disabled 
newborn, for whom she was a primary caretaker.258  Since according to the 
textual interpretation of the UK Disability Discrimination Act of 1995, prior 
to changes to incorporate the 2000 Directive, national law did not protect 
discrimination by association, the question arose whether the incorporation 
of the Directive extended antidiscrimination protection to persons such as 
the plaintiff in the main action.  The ECJ held that it did.259  Even if the text 
of the Directive is silent on this point, the Court found that the principle of 
non-discrimination protects employees treated less favorably because of the 
disability of their children whose care they provide.260  The Court‘s 
approach explicitly rejected calls for a narrow interpretation of the principle 
of equal treatment on the ground that such an interpretation would hamper 
the social and economic integration of disabled persons.261  
In a forceful Opinion, AG Maduro urged the Court to reach this result 
and laid down the decision‘s normative foundations. In stark contrast to AG 
Geelhoed in Navas, AG Maduro invoked the principle of equality, referring 
to it as ―not  merely a political ideal and aspiration but one of the 
fundamental principles of Community law.‖262  Moreover, he identified the 
normative aim of Article 13 and the Directive as the protection of the 
 
 254. Id. ¶ 75. 
 255. See Alan Dashwood, From Van Duyn to Mangold via Marshall: Reducing 
Direct Effect to Absurdity?, CAMBRIDGE Y.B. OF EUR. LEGAL STUD. 81, 108 (2007); 
Sebastian Krebber, The Social Rights Approach of the European Court of Justice to 
Enforce European Employment Law, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL‘Y J. 377, 381 (2006); 
Marlene Schmidt, The Principle of Nondiscrimination in Respect of Age: Dimensions of 
the ECJ‟s Mangold Judgment, 7 GERMAN L.J. 505 (2006).  
 256. See Mangold, 2005 E.C.R. I-09981, ¶ 74, 76; see also Case C-555/07, 
Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, 2010 C.M.L.R. 33.  
 257. Case C-303/06, Coleman v. Attridge Law, 2008 E.C.R. I-05603. 
 258. Id. ¶ 22. 
 259. Id. ¶ 56.  
 260. See id. ¶ 38. 
 261. See id. ¶¶ 42–43, 47.  
 262. Opinion of Advoc. Gen., Coleman, ¶ 8. 
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dignity and autonomy of persons who belong to the suspect classifications 
listed in the text.263  Denial of protection against discrimination by 
association would harm persons with disabilities by limiting the protection 
of their caregivers.264  As AG Maduro noted in his Opinion, ―[p]eople 
belonging to certain groups are often more vulnerable than the average 
person, so they have come to rely on individuals with whom they are closely 
associated for help in their effort to lead a life according to the fundamental 
choices they have made.‖265  The normative interplay between vulnerability 
and dignity plays an important role in the AG‘s opinion.  After establishing 
that Article 13 expresses the Community‘s commitment to equality, and that 
the values underlying equality are human dignity and autonomy, the opinion 
concludes that ―[t]he aim of Article 13 and of the Directive is to protect the 
dignity and autonomy of persons belonging to those suspect 
classifications.‖266  
However one might label this analysis, it certainly does not portray a 
court retreating into a minimalist stance.  To the contrary, it is as assertive 
as any of the Court‘s earlier bold, teleological pronouncements.  The puzzle 
is how to square its approach here to that in Navas.  Ms. Navas was also in a 
vulnerable situation. Having been laid off from her catering firm, she was 
sick at home without the prospect of returning to a job when she recovered, 
if she recovered fully.  What the AG pointed out in Coleman in the context 
of getting a job surely applies in the context of keeping a job: ―it is of 
fundamental significance for every individual, not merely for as a means of 
earning one‘s living but also as an important way of self-fulfillment and 
realization of one‘s potential.‖267  To be fired exclusively because of a 
health condition reduces one to a lower status and denies her equal 
opportunities for self-fulfillment.  Sometimes employers discriminate 
against employees whose medical condition impacts on their public lives 
because they don‘t want to have them around.  Other times, they do it 
because it is too costly or too burdensome to work out accommodations for 
them.  Whatever the employer‘s reasons, why should the Directive be 
 
 263. The AG Opinion in Navas refers to the ―policy‖ of equality. Opinion of Advoc. 
Gen., Navas, para. 53.  The AG in Coleman, on the other hand, speaks forcefully of the 
―principle‖ of equality.  See Opinion of Advoc. Gen., Coleman, ¶ 8. 
 264. In AG Maduro‘s view, the Directive does not protect an employee from being 
treated less favorably only because of her own disability; it is sufficient that she be 
treated less favorably because of ―disability‖ —hers or others. See Opinion of Advoc. 
Gen., Coleman, ¶ 23. 
 265. Id. ¶ 14.  It is noteworthy that this statement contains none of the paternalism of 
the charity model according to which persons with disabilities must rely on others.  AG 
Maduro in fact emphasizes common human vulnerability and asserts that the legal 
regime that protects people‘s fundamental choices also respects their dignity. 
 266. Opinion of Advoc. Gen., Coleman, ¶¶ 8–10. (arguing that the principle of human 
dignity necessitates that ―individuals and political institutions must not act in a way that 
denies the intrinsic importance of every human life‖). 
 267. See id.¶  11 (―Access to employment and professional development are of 
fundamental significance for every individual, not merely as a means of earning one‘s 
living but also as an important way of self-fulfillment and realisation of one‘s 
potential.‖).  
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interpreted as requiring anything other than similarity of treatment, namely 
prohibition?  
Interestingly, the AG‘s opinion in Coleman more or less ignored the 
Navas decision, or at least its justification.  The Court‘s judgment mentions 
it by way of answering the submissions of Member States that relied on 
Navas to convince the Court not to expand protection under the Directive 
ratione personae or ratione materiae beyond the explicit provisions of the 
text.  The Court rejected this interpretation and pointed out that Navas did 
not hold that the principle of equal treatment should be interpreted strictly 
within the scope of the Directive.268  According to the Coleman Court, 
Navas interpreted narrowly only the protected classes to which the Directive 
extends generous protection under the principle of equal protection.269  This 
is a surprising argument.  First, the Court‘s medical interpretation of 
disability in Navas violated the basic dialectic of legal interpretation, 
according to which the architecture of a text might provide the pathway by 
which its central concepts need to be interpreted.  That is what respect for a 
text means.  In the case of a law, structural interpretation—reading one 
provision in light of all others—helps to identify the normative spirit of the 
text.  Even a reader unconcerned with the Court‘s departure from legislative 
history cannot help but see the disconnect between the spirit of the Directive 
and the Court‘s definition of disability.  Second, the Court‘s own 
interpretation of Navas, combined with its holding and justification in 
Coleman, refutes the jurisprudential explanation.  It was not the Court‘s 
timidity toward the claims of equality that explain the Navas decision. 
The jurisprudence of equality does not explain the narrow definition of 
disability in Navas.  We will not understand that definition better by 
approaching it through the lens of equality, at least not in this doctrinal way.  
A different explanation is necessary.  In this subsection, I have discussed 
and rejected three grounds for the narrow medical model of disability.  
These grounds, which are endogenous to legal reasoning, explained the turn 
to conceptualism by reference to doctrine, the method of interpretation, and 
the jurisprudence of equality.  I turn next to a brief discussion of three 
possible exogenous explanations.   
B. Exogenous Explanations 
This section introduces three explanations of the judicial turn to 
conceptualism that are exogenous, so to speak, to the internal logic of legal 
reasoning in the cases that marked the turn. The explanations focus on the 
larger ideological currents and crosscurrents that have characterized the 
political and legal debates surrounding the protection of persons with 
disabilities (ideological explanations) and, more briefly, on the institutional 
actors (sociological explanations) and the relations among them 
(institutional explanations).  As in the preceding section, these are 
 
 268. See Coleman, 2008 E.C.R. I-05603, ¶ 46.  
 269. See id. 
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explanations first articulated in the American context and whose cogency 
can be tested when put to a nuanced comparative test. Finding European 
equivalents to this set of exogenous explanations will be more difficult than 
the explanations discussed in the previous section.  In addition to obvious 
differences in the political and institutional environments in the U.S. and the 
EU, difficulties stem from these explanations resting on hypotheses that can 
be tested only over periods of time longer than the one which has passed 
since the implementation of the Framework Directive.  The rich experience 
of litigation under the ADA makes possible the fuller articulation of these 
explanations in the American context. Nevertheless, even if some of their 
European equivalents are by necessity incomplete, understanding the 
judiciary‘s approach requires at least the specification of these hypotheses.  
This section shows that exogenous explanations do not, either severally or 
together, offer full and cogent explanations of the judicial turn to 
conceptualism. 
The following analysis can be read ―deconstructively,‖ as a study of 
strategies the European Court of Justice deployed in rationalizing its pre-
deliberative outcome.  Seeking to explain a judicial outcome by reaching to 
elements outside judicial reasoning might signal that the outcome itself is 
the expression of bias to the extent that the reasons supporting the outcome 
simply cover judges‘ initial preferences or intuitions about the case.  Such a 
deconstructive reading is helpful but likely implausible and in any event 
insufficient.  After learning whatever deconstruction can teach, one might 
still want to know why the judicial preferences and intuitions aligned the 
way they did –in our case, why they aligned with the narrow interpretation 
of disability.  And that is a question that the explanations discussed below 
cannot fully answer.  
1. Ideological Explanations: The Market and the Social as a Political 
Double Helix 
An impairment-centered definition of disability, in the employment 
context, narrows the class of persons who can claim protection and frees 
employers to rely on their market analysis when making employment 
decisions.  For instance, Ms. Navas‘ employer can decide that replacing her 
with temporary workers is more costly for the business than paying her 
financial compensation for an unlawful dismissal.  Put differently, 
employers can act based on cost-benefit analysis more often than if they 
were bound to respect their employees‘ nondiscrimination rights.  Does this 
market-ideology reading explain the narrow interpretation of disability?  
As always with ideological arguments, one must distinguish a simple—
or simplistic—version from a more sophisticated one.  According to the 
former, judges are part of a conservative elite that furthers the interests of 
their caste by enhancing the economic power of employers over and above 
the rights of vulnerable employees, whom they leave at the mercy of not 
particularly merciful market forces.  The problem with this approach is that 
judges are not always, or even often, drawn from the privileged elite and, 
even if they were, it would hardly follow that they would therefore feel 
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inclined to protect their caste.
  
In the more nuanced version, as applied in the 
case of disability litigation, the ideological implications of judicial decisions 
are seen as unintended consequences of the rhetoric deployed in the political 
genesis of disability antidiscrimination statutes.  Two different grounds 
form the double helix of that rhetoric: equality of opportunity and market 
efficiency.  The ideological explanation places central emphasis on courts‘ 
unwillingness or incapacity to disentangle the two grounds.  Failure to 
disentangle these grounds means that conflicts of interpretation and 
application of disability statutes will be fueled by deeper conflicts of these 
values.  The ideological lens shows that, as between equality and market 
efficiency, courts will favor the market.  
Both equal opportunity and market efficiency figured prominently in 
how actors across the political spectrum converged in their support for the 
disability legislation on both sides of the Atlantic.  As we saw in Part I, 
legislation for the protection of persons with disabilities enjoyed large 
bipartisan support.270  This was true both in the U.S. and the European 
Community, although for different reasons.  In the American context, the 
explanation has to do with market-based arguments that convinced 
conservative Republicans to throw their support behind that legislation.  It is 
economically inefficient, this argument goes, when persons with disabilities 
who are able to work are denied that opportunity and instead receive welfare 
benefits.  In the context of the European Community, the explanation has to 
do with its transcendent economic purpose and nature.  Yet, despite the 
different origins in the preeminence of the economic rationale for disability 
nondiscrimination legislation, the ideological explanation seeks to 
demonstrate that the judicial turn to conceptualism is a function of 
economic rationality being deployed to ―cover‖ the principle of equal 
opportunity.  In what follows, I briefly present the different roots of the 
economic rationale and then investigate the soundness of the ideological 
explanation. 
Bipartisan political support for disability legislation represented the 
convergence of political parties and institutions acting on different 
motivations.  In the U.S., it was assumed that the political left would 
support disability legislation, at least after the struggle for recognition of 
persons with disabilities followed, in both claims and rhetoric, the template 
of struggles for recognition of previous civil rights and women‘s rights 
movements, which the left had supported.271  More surprising, however, was 
the support for disability legislation from the political right.  Apart from 
serendipitous stories of political leaders supporting the plight of disabled 
individuals for personal reasons, the political right was driven to embrace 
the cause of disability rights by traditional arguments for market 
efficiency.272  It was a market inefficiency to keep unemployed persons with 
 
 270. See supra text accompanying notes 79–81. 
 271. See SKRENTNY, supra note 58, at 269. 
 272. A number of critiques from academics argue that the ADA does not promote 
market efficiency.  See Scotch, Models, supra note 3, at 219 (citing CAROLYN L. 
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disabilities at home on social security payroll, if they were perfectly capable 
of working.273  While the rhetoric of market efficiency did not come easily 
to the political left, or to some disability rights advocates, embracing it 
seemed like a worthwhile tradeoff since it delivered broad bipartisan 
support that guaranteed legislative success.  Market efficiency and the 
equality of opportunity rationale became intertwined in the political origin 
of the bill.274   
The market and social reasoning also provide the political double helix 
of disability policy at the European supranational level.  The Directive 
expressly mentions the principle of equal opportunity in Article 1.275  The 
Commission‘s 1996 strategy, which sanctioned the social model and marked 
a turning point in the Community disability policy, mentions that ―[i]n 
economic terms, structural exclusion and discrimination on the grounds of 
disability also sap labor market efficiency.  A market that structurally 
excludes a significant proportion of its human resources cannot be described 
as efficient, much less fair.  Society as a whole (including the taxpayer) 
loses out when ability is not duly acknowledged and enabled to work.‖276  
Under this model, it is typical to find references to persons with disabilities 
as ―a much-underused source of labor in Europe, which could contribute to 
overall economic growth.‖277  The rationale of market efficiency is 
intertwined with the principle of equal opportunity.  For instance, the 
official action plan for 2008–2009 mentions ―the growing economic 
dimension: [t]he exclusion of people with disabilities from the labor market 
is a serious concern, from the perspective of equal opportunities.  There is 
also an economic dimension to this problem: faced with a shrinking 
workforce resulting from demographic change, the 2006 Spring European 
Council highlighted the need to make the most of the untapped potential of 
many people excluded from the labor market and identified disabled people 
 
WEAVER, Incentives versus Controls in Federal Disability Policy, in DISABILITY AND 
WORK at 6–7) (―[The ADA] includes in the protected population people who, in an 
economic sense, are not as productive or do not make the same contribution to 
profitability of the firm as other people with the same qualifications . . . . While 
promoting the employment of this much broader group may be a highly desirable social 
goal, the antidiscrimination-reasonable accommodation approach is a costly and 
inefficient way of doing so and is likely to have highly undesirable distributional 
consequences.‖).  
 273. See SKRENTNY, supra note 58, at 267; Burke, supra note 15, at 162; Scotch, 
Models, supra note 3, at 218–221; Scotch, Politics and Policy, supra note 68, at 394–397 
(discussing policy advocacy in a conservative era). 
 274. See Americans with Disabilities Act, Preamble, ¶ 5.  
 275. See Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 12, art. 1.  
 276. See 1996 EC Disability Strategy, supra note 54, at ¶ 12.  The social model 
figured prominently even before 1996.  For a description of the economic justification of 
non-discrimination on grounds of disability in the early stages of Community action in 
this area, see Gerard Quinn, The European Social Charter and EU Anti-Discrimination 
Law in the Field of Disability: Two Gravitational Fields with One Common Purpose, in 
SOCIAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE 280 (Gráinne de Búrca & Bruno de Witte eds., 2005). 
 277. See Commission Staff Working Paper: Disability Mainstreaming in the 
European Employment Strategy, at 5, COM (2005) EMCO/11/290605 (Jul. 1, 2005).  
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as one of the key priority groups.‖278  
 
The prominence of market explanations alongside equality can also to 
some extent be explained on non-ideological grounds. The Community‘s 
initial economic aims created a path dependency that lives on in the 
language of policy.  Moreover there is the lingering concern with how 
policies fit within the competencies scheme of a Community of limited 
powers.  The prominence of the market rationale points to that dimension of 
disability antidiscrimination policies aimed at bringing them squarely within 
the Community competence.  It is therefore unsurprising to find a structural, 
competence layer in both arguments about ―the policy of equality‖279 as well 
as in arguments about ―the principle of equality.‖280  The same is true, and 
largely for similar reasons, about the language and arguments in which the 
Community‘s gender equality policies have been cast.281
 
The explanatory power of the ideological perspective is nevertheless 
significant.  For instance, it points to the mixture of conflicting political 
rationales and their corresponding political values, to understand statements 
such as the AG‘s in Navas to the effect that ―there is even less room . . . for 
widening the scope of Article 13 EC by relying on the general policy of 
equality.‖282 Article 13 would have had a larger radiating effect if the AG 
had invoked the principle of equality.283  From an ideologically-focused 
prism, on display here are the effects of how the market efficiency rationale 
shapes—or corrupts, in the language of social systems theory—the equality 
rationale in the genealogy of disability policy.284  
 
 278. Commission Communication: Situation of the Disabled People in the European 
Union: The European Action Plan 2008–2009, at 3, COM (2007) 738 final (November 
26, 2007); see also Commission Communication: Situation of Disabled people in the 
Enlarged European Union: The European Action Plan 2006–2007, at 3, (COM (2005) 
604 final (Nov. 28, 2005) (―Given the current demographic situation, the economic 
potential of disabled people and the contribution they can make to economic and 
employment growth must be further activated on the basis of the Social Agenda for 
2005–2010‖). 
 279. For instance, AG Geelhoed in Navas, after noting that the legislative history and 
grammar of the Treaty do not support an expansive definition of disability, dedicated a 
more substantial part of his Opinion to policy arguments, warning against the 
―potentially far-reaching economic and financial consequences‖ of an expansive 
definition of disability.‖  Opinion of Advoc. Gen., Navas, ¶¶ 49, 51.  In his view, such a 
definition would interfere with the Member States‘ sovereign decisions about the 
allocation of available public resources, thus impacting on areas such as employment 
policy and social welfare in which the Community has mostly complementary powers.  
See id. ¶ 52.   
 280. See Opinion of Advoc. Gen., Coleman, ¶ 8. 
 281. See Burke, supra note 15, at 168 (―[The] redefinition of disability as an issue of 
economic competitiveness has a venerable tradition at the European Union: it parallels 
the primary rationale for EU-level action on gender equality that began in the 1970s.‖).  
 282. Opinion of Advoc. Gen., Navas, ¶ 53.   
 283.  The Court had previously relied on the general principle of nondiscrimination in 
Community law, for instance in the context of age discrimination.  See Mangold, 2005 
E.C.R. I-09981; David L. Hosking, A High Bar for EU Disability Rights, 36 INDUS. L.J. 
228, 231 (2007).  
 284. See Case C-217/91, Spain v. Commission, 1993 E.C.R. I-3953, ¶ 37.  
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The ideological explanation captures something important about the 
legal implications of political rhetoric surrounding the judicial interpretation 
of disability antidiscrimination statutes.  This explanation supplements 
endogenous accounts by showing that the market rationale coexists with the 
equal opportunity rationale in the formulation of disability policy.  Part of 
its claim must also be that the judicial turn to conceptualism is the effect of 
the market rationale normatively corrupting the equality rationale.  But it 
falls short as a comprehensive explanation of that phenomenon.  The 
ideological explanation does not show why courts focus on the definition of 
the protected class, rather than seeking to cut back on antidiscrimination 
protection at the discrimination stage of the analysis.  The same ideological 
biases would presumably manifest themselves in the later stage of litigation, 
when courts must determine whether the employer discriminated against the 
disabled employee.  We have seen that many cases do not even reach this 
analysis since they end at the stage of determining whether the plaintiff 
meets the statutory definition of disability.  Why, then, do courts focus their 
analysis at that step?  One possible answer, consistent with the ideological 
explanation, would be that the definitional focus gives judicial analysis at 
least the appearance of ideological neutrality.  But that answer still does not 
capture what in the conceptual structure of disability protection makes the 
definitional moment a pressure point that could be exploited: why, under 
pressure—ideological or not—does the model break at that particular point?  
Without an answer to that question, the ultimate explanation of the 
resilience of the medical model in the narrow interpretation of disability 
remains elusive.  I will next argue that the answer rests not solely with 
courts, the market, ideology, doctrine, or institutions, but also with the 
arguments in support of the social model.   
2. Sociological Explanations: The Vagaries of Professional Judgment  
The resilience of the medicalized model of disability in the judgments 
of American courts is sometimes explained as a spillover effect of broader 
developments within the legal and political system.  According to this 
account, the Supreme Court‘s 1999 decisions represented the judicial 
ratification of the ADA‘s implementation guidelines.  To understand the 
resilience of the model, one needs to take into consideration the mindsets 
and professional experiences of those who drafted the guidelines.285  
Specifically, there were two such implementation regulations, one issued by 
the Department of Justice (―DOJ‖) and the other by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (―EEOC‖).286  The DOJ regulations were similar 
to the ones that that had directed the Section 504 regulations implementing 
 
 285. This sociological analysis also applies to the training of employment lawyers 
that later litigated ADA cases.  These training sessions focused to a great extent on 
conceptual issues regarding the definition of disability.  See Feldblum, supra note18, at 
138.  
 286. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (EEOC 
regulations); 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36) (DOJ 
regulations). 
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the 1973 Rehabilitation Act.287  The EEOC regulations, however, departed 
from the Section 504 regulations in two important respects.  Those 
regulations ―included, for the first time, a definition of the term 
‗substantially limits‘‖ and required, for the first time in disability 
jurisprudence, an individualized assessment to determine whether a person 
met the statutory definition of disability.288  The EEOC regulations also 
introduced regulations on the major life activity of ―working,‖ which 
commentators regarded as remnants of the medical model whose traces in 
this definition are still visible today.289  Thus, according to the sociological 
account, the narrow interests of professionals in charge of overseeing the 
ADA‘s implementation prevailed over the drafters‘ intentions.290  This 
sociological account helpfully expands the relevant framework of analysis.  
However, the sociological argument cannot tell the whole story.  It matters 
greatly who the actors are, beyond and including judges, but that is only one 
of the many things that matter.  The sociological account does not explain 
what made the definition of disability malleable because the same outcomes 
would have been achieved should implementation regulations and courts 
have decided to interpret the discrimination prong of the disability analysis 
narrowly.   
Of all the explanations discussed in Part III, the sociological 
explanation is perhaps the one most difficult to find equivalences between 
the U.S. and Europe, at least so long as the conversation about the latter 
remains focused at the supranational level.  In the absence of 
implementation regulations at the EU level, there are not enough elements 
to construct analogies.  Such analogies would perhaps be possible if we 
reached into the national bureaucracies.  But it is simply too soon to tell 
what effects the Directive had at that level, given that national cases 
involving the interpretation of disability have not yet found their way to the 
national courts of last resort, in light of the ECJ‘s decision in Navas.  
 
 287. See Feldblum, supra note 18, at 134.  The only medical impairment they 
addressed specifically was HIV, which as we have seen, courts had encountered in the 
1980s.  See id. at 135. 
 288. See id. at 135–36 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (1999); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, 
App. at 349 (1999)). 
 289. See Feldblum, supra note 1818, at 137, 143 ―The resonance of the requirement 
that an individual be unable to work, in a whole range of jobs no less, in order to meet 
the ADA‘s definition of disability reflects the staying power of the historical image of 
the ‗disabled person‘ as a person who is unable to work and unable to function in 
society.  This imagine may well make intuitive sense to people because society does, 
indeed, provide cash payments for those who qualify for disability benefit plans.  The 
idea, however, that the ADA was designed to prohibit discrimination against people with 
disabilities who can work, and hence, for example, are not seeking disability cash 
benefits, does not seem to have penetrated the minds of many judges.‖  Id. at 143.  
 290. See Krieger, Afterword, supra note 17, at 501 (―[F]ew people outside of [a] 
relatively small circle, including federal judges empowered to interpret the ADA, 
understand the social model of disability or adhere to the norms, values, and interpretive 
perspectives it was designed to advance.‖). 
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3. Institutional Explanations: In Search of Systemic Equilibrium 
Finally, there is an institutional reading of the conflict between courts 
and Congress regarding the ADA‘s interpretation of disability.  From this 
perspective, Sutton‘s unambiguous rejection of legislative history was an 
institutional ―power grab.‖291 Using the same logic, the 2008 ADA 
Amendments Act  represents Congress‘ comeback.  It has often been noted 
that ―a lack of visible opposition to disability rights proposals is a pattern 
one sees in all the polities in which such proposals have reached the 
legislative agenda.‖292  When combined with the ideological explanation, 
the institutional account shows how the ideological balance and systemic 
equilibrium are restored on institutional grounds.  What this account has a 
hard time explaining is why courts chose the battlefield of the definition of 
disability to flex their muscles at Congress.  And that question does not have 
an institutional answer.  
It is quite difficult to find an equivalent of this explanation in the 
European context.  The argument that the ECJ‘s decision in Navas was 
meant to restore the institutional equilibrium by countering powerful social 
movements, who had enshrined their agenda in the Framework Directive, 
rings hollow.  The European system has other mechanisms for restoring 
institutional equilibrium when imbalances are present.  There is, however, a 
different way of framing the institutional argument as to fall squarely within 
a larger debate about the relationship between courts and political 
institutions.  This perspective points to the institutional consequences of 
judicial intervention, even when those interventions are not motivated by 
strategic ideological action.  Thus, even when courts do not act on any 
ulterior motives, their interventions inflict damage to the extent they 
undermine regulatory experimentation.293  Navas illustrates the danger of 
judicial intervention.  In just one case, the ECJ managed to undermine 
political efforts for a new disability policy that had been underway in 
Europe since 1996.  Moreover, its intervention entrenched an autonomous 
and unitary ―European meaning of disability.‖294  Even if that definition is a 
floor, and not a ceiling, the low floor changed the disability policy 
landscape.295  The Court‘s decision was not informed by the rich history of 
 
 291. See COLKER, supra note 79, at 201–202 (―In Sutton, [the Court] has told 
Congress that the Court is entirely uninterested in the record Congress creates while 
drafting legislation.  These conflicting methodological approaches to examining the 
work of Congress can be understood only as power grab by the Court at the expense of 
Congress.  Ultimately, individuals with disabilities are the losers in the separation-of-
powers battle.‖). 
 292. Burke, supra note 15, at 167.  
 293. The new governance literature makes this point in intricate detail.  See, e.g., 
Gráinne de Burca & Neil Walker, Reconceiving Law and New Governance, 13 COL. J. OF 
EUR. LAW 519 (2007).  For an argument about experimentalism in the European context, 
see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 
98 COL. L. REV. 267 (1998); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization 
Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004). 
 294. See supra text accompanying note 154. 
 295. See, e.g., de Burca, supra note 8, at text accompanying notes 48–50 (discussing 
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thinking about disability regulations, which had informed the Framework 
Directive.  According to this interpretation of the sociological explanation, 
much is lost when courts intervene in the legislative process in this 
uninformed manner.  However, this explanation disregards that enforceable 
rights need independent institutions such as courts to enforce them.  As we 
will see in Part IV, framing the question as one of rights has been crucial in 
the evolution of the self-understanding of the disability rights movement. 
This explains why calls to action after Navas have not demanded that courts 
be sidestepped, but only that they act to enforce the political program 
embedded in the Framework Directive.296  
IV. Impairment, Discrimination and the Legal Construction of 
Disability 
The explanations discussed in Part III—doctrinal, interpretative, 
jurisprudential, ideological, institutional and sociological—are insufficient 
to understand the staying power of the medicalized approach to disability in 
judicial decisions.  In this section, I seek to provide the missing parts of the 
explanation.  I turn to the social model itself and specifically to the interplay 
between, on the one hand, its conceptualization of illness, impairment, and 
disability and, on the other hand, the broader argumentative strategies that 
the disability rights movement deployed in its struggle for recognition of the 
equal status of persons with disabilities.297  As we will see, it is difficult to 
disentangle the substance of the model‘s main claims from the 
argumentative strategies deployed in advocating for disability reform both 
in Europe and in the United States.  
The analysis is divided into two sections.  In section 4.1., I argue that 
failure to provide an account of medical impairments left courts bereft of 
guidance on how to interpret disability according to the social model and 
made them seek refuge in the more familiar territory of the medicalized 
approach.  The decision to leave medical impairments under-theorized was 
not an accident. It was, rather, the response of social model theorists to the 
perceived risk that an analogy between impairments and illness would 
 
the changes in the Commission‘s position in negotiating the UN Convention on the 
Protection of Persons with Disabilities); supra text accompanying notes 160–161 
(documenting the reaction of the disability rights movement, specifically the call for a 
comprehensive disability directive).  
 296. The above observations refer to the inter-institutional dimension. But there are 
also relevant intra-institutional aspects.  For instance, administrative issues such as an 
unmanageably large docket or the lack of built-in scrutiny in the practice of unanimous 
decisions are also relevant.  As was mentioned in Part II, the lack of even an inkling of 
the social model in the Navas judgment is striking. See supra text accompanying notes 
155–156.  The assumption that reasonable accommodation is a form of positive 
discrimination in Coleman is another.  See Coleman, 2008 E.C.R. I-05603, ¶ 42.  
 297. See also BAGENSTOS, supra note 24, at 54 (commenting on the Supreme Court‘s 
definition-of-disability cases, noting that ―[t]hose decisions are deeply flawed but they 
do not belong to the Supreme Court alone.  Instead, they flow directly from the minority-
group model and the independence frame that disability activists themselves formulated 
and promoted.‖).  
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legitimize the dominion of medical expertise and perpetuate socially 
disabling assumptions about normality.  This argumentative strategy 
distorted the claims to recognition of persons with disabilities.  In section 
4.2., I suggest that the medicalized approach is the effect of convergence 
between courts‘ institutional concerns with administrability of potentially 
sweeping disability statutes, on the one hand, and the social movements‘ 
fears that only a strong social discrimination approach could create the 
shared political consciousness necessary for reform, on the other hand.  I 
present this as an explanatory account that does not aim to justify the 
survival of narrow, medicalized definitions of disability.  
One caveat is necessary before we proceed.  My argument in this 
section refers to the social model and assumes that the social model 
informed the claims of the disability rights movement(s). However, as 
Samuel Bagenstos has recently shown, the social movement, at least in the 
United States, has spoken in different—and oftentimes conflicting—
voices.298  Some disability advocates have supported a minority-based 
approach whereas others have argued that disability is a matter of degree.  
Some strands of the movement have embraced the welfare policies for 
persons with disabilities, others have opposed them; some have been 
reluctant to criticize the ascendency of medical professionals, others yet 
have spoken viscerally against the claims of medical experts over the lives 
of persons with disabilities.299  These positions seem so fundamentally 
different that one can reasonably question their unity.  Anticipating 
precisely such questions, Bagenstos traces their commonality to a shared 
allegiance to the social model. He writes that ―the one position that 
approaches consensus within the movement . . . [is] the endorsement of a 
social rather than a medical model of disability.‖300  The social model is, in 
this view, compatible with the wide diversity of projects that characterized 
the social movement for disability rights.  Yet for that to be true, the social 
model would need to be more like a vague insight about the social 
rootedness of disability than a full-blown, articulate model.  That seems to 
be Bagenstos‘s view, and the reason why he focuses the analysis on the 
different projects of disability rights advocates, rather than on the social 
model that underpins these overall social movements.  I take a different 
approach and focus instead on the social model, and especially on its early 
theorists, and only tangentially on the diverging claims of the disability 
rights movement.  If one seeks to understand the staying power of the 
medicalized model, especially in judicial definitions of disability, I believe 
that this approach is preferable.  Rather than a vague insight, the social 
model appears as a set of claims whose intellectual origins explain and 
influence over time; it adds the missing elements to the previously discussed 
explanations for the staying power of the medicalized model in judicial 
definitions of disability. 
 
 298. See id. at 12–33.   
 299. See id.  
 300. Id. at 13.  
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A. Conceptual Forensics: Medical Impairments 
Medical impairments remain central to the definition of disability even 
in regulatory regimes purportedly grounded on a conception of disability as 
the result of social discrimination, rather than illness.  The ECJ interpreted 
the silence of the European Framework Directive and defined disability as 
―a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or 
psychological impairments and which hinders the participation of the person 
concerned in professional life.‖301  The ADA‘s current disability prong 
defines a person with a disability as someone with ―a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities 
of such individual.‖302  As we have seen in Part I, the drafters of the ADA 
did not consider it necessary to modify this definition, which was taken 
almost ad litteram from the 1973 Rehabilitation Act.303  The 2008 ADA 
Amendments Act (ADAAA) also leaves that definition unmodified.  
Impairments would have remained central to the definition of disability 
even in the bolder proposals for the amendments, which were eventually 
deemed politically unpalatable.304  Those bolder proposals would have 
defined disability as a present, past, or perceived impairment.305  I argue 
below that even those proposals would have been insufficient to deliver the 
kind of reform for which disability advocates hope.  In the American case of 
a statutory definition, or the European case, where the highest court 
stipulates the definition in order to fill a gap in legislation, the question of 
the subsequent interpretation of medical impairment is consequential.  The 
definition of disability itself should provide a guide to how to interpret 
medical impairments.  
Consider the options available to courts in interpreting the concept of 
medical impairments from the perspective of both the medical and social 
models.  The latter interpretation centers on society‘s discriminatory 
reaction to the existence—or perception—of a present—or past—
impairment.  The social model interpretation emphasizes the social effects 
 
 301. Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 43.  The Court here followed AG 
Geelhoed, who endorsed this approach.  He argued that the emphasis is on the ―serious 
functional limitations (disabilities) due to physical, psychological or mental afflictions.‖  
Opinion of Advoc. Gen., Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 76.  The act of 
discrimination is a reaction to the social effects of the medical condition, and it is 
severable from it: ―the health problem as cause of the functional limitation should in 
principle be distinguished from that limitation‖  Id. ¶ 77. 
 302. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).  Moreover, and as we have seen, the Court‘s 
interpretation of the present-disability prong, and specifically its focus on the ―major life 
activities‖ prong at the expense of the other elements of the definition had the effect of 
actually folding ―the later two spikes into the first spur so that the question of defining 
whether or not a plaintiff has a disability is determined almost exclusively by disputes 
about the loss of a major life activity.‖  Hahn, supra note 178, at 171.  Hahn goes on to 
argue that judges‘ confusion over impairment and disability led to the neglect of the 
second and third prong of the ADA definition of disability.  See id.  
 303. See supra text accompanying notes 83–84. 
 304. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 24, at 45. 
 305. See id. at 44.  
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of impairments.  By contrast, the medical model underscores the relevance 
of factors intrinsic to the medical impairment.  For instance, in the United 
States, the EEOC interpretation guidelines recommended the consideration 
of ―(i) the nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) the duration or 
expected duration of the impairment; (iii) the permanent or long-term 
impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact of our resulting from 
the impairment.‖306  This focus on the nature, rather than the social effect, of 
medical impairments goes against the tenets of the social model.  The 
question arises, how have the theorists of the social model attempted to steer 
the interpretation of medical impairments away from their nature and to 
their social effects? 
Evidence suggests that little was done in this regard.  Social model 
theorists shied away from theorizing about medical impairments altogether.  
Indeed, because definitions of disability made either direct reference to 
medical impairment, or were interpreted by judges to imply such references, 
courts failed to theorize about medical impairments, which explains in part 
why the medicalized approach to disability survived in judicial 
interpretations of the definition of disability.  What then explains failure to 
theorize about medical impairments within the broader context of the social 
model?  
This failure was not accidental, but rather the outcome of strategic 
choices.  Social model theorists acknowledged the need to theorize about 
medical impairments but only within a comprehensive social theory of 
disability, and not in the confines of the social model.  While one should 
always be cautious not to overlook differences on this point among social 
model theorists, many of its early advocates believed that including a theory 
of impairment in the social model could undermine the model‘s political 
effectiveness.  As one of the model‘s prominent theorists put it, ―[t]he denial 
of impairment has not, in reality, been a denial at all.  Rather it has been a 
pragmatic attempt to identify and address issues that can be changed 
through collective action rather than medical or other professional 
treatment.‖307  This pragmatic political awareness was more than an 
additional strategic layer to a self-standing normative argument; it pervaded 
the normative core of the social model.  That core, and the political strategy 
for conveying the claims effectively, remained deeply entangled. 
The key for understanding their entanglement is to recall that the 
project of transformation that social model theorists envisaged was—and to 
some extent still is—comprehensive, not piecemeal.  The wholesale shift 
from an individual to a social approach is premised on disconnecting 
disability from illness: ―The achievement of the disability movement has 
 
 306. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (1999).  
 307. OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 11, at 41–42 (―We must not assume that 
models in general and the social model in particular can do everything: that it can 
explain disability in totality.  It is not a social theory of disability and it cannot do the 
work of social theory. . . . An adequate social theory of disability must contain a theory 
of impairment . . . . So let‘s develop a social model of impairment to stand alongside a 
social model of disability but let‘s not pretend that either or both are social theory.‖). 
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been to break the link between our bodies and our social situation, and to 
focus on the real cause of disability, i.e. discrimination and prejudice. To 
mention biology, to admit pain, to confront our impairments, has been to 
risk the oppressors seizing on evidence that disability is ‗really‘ about 
physical limitation after all.‖308  From the perspective of the social model, 
there are at least three reasons for the radical break from the medical model 
by severing the links between disability and illness.  First is to rescue the 
fate of persons with disabilities from the conceptual framework of medical 
expertise that labeled them ―patients‖ in need of help.309  Second is to 
challenge unwarranted but widely shared presuppositions of normality.  
Third, such a separation would prevent the ―dilution‖ of the class of persons 
with disabilities and thus clear some of the hurdles in the formation of their 
common identity.  I take up the third reason in the next section, in which I 
discuss the arguments from medical expertise and presuppositions of 
normality.  
Like most forms of expertise, medical expertise has the tendency to 
impose its interpretative code on social contexts that extend beyond its 
proper domain.  Hence the predicament of disabled individuals under the 
reign of medical expertise: ―The problem arises when doctors try to use 
their knowledge and skill to treat disability rather than illness.  Disability as 
a long-term social state is not treatable medically and is certainly not 
curable.  Hence many disabled people experience much medical 
intervention as, at best, inappropriate, and, at worst, oppressive.‖310  By 
placing the decisional center in the hands of medical professionals and 
outside the lives of persons with disabilities, this approach denies the latter‘s 
agency and undercuts their opportunities for self-determination.311  The 
expert physician is at the interface between society and persons with 
disabilities, denying them ―the dignity of risk.‖312  It is the expert that can 
assist the disabled individual to overcome his or her impairment and 
(re)learn how to work.  The social opportunities of persons with disabilities 
follow from the classifications determined by the medical professional.313  
 
 308. See id. at 39 (citing M.  Shakespeare).  From this perspective, impairment and 
illness should be kept separate.  The latter requires medical treatment, impairments might 
not.  The confusion results from the colonizing tendency of the medical approach. 
 309. See Scotch, Social Movement, supra note 15, at 162 (―By promoting the image 
of disabled people as dependent and in need of professional help, medical and 
rehabilitation professionals retain control over program beneficiaries at the cost of 
severely constraining the disabled person.‖). 
 310. OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 11, at 36.  Oliver continues, ―[t]his should 
not be seen as a personal attack on individual doctors, or indeed the medical profession, 
for they, too, are trapped in a set of social relations with which they are not trained or 
equipped to deal.‖  Id.  
 311. MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT 5 (1990) [hereinafter OLIVER, 
POLITICS].  ―The problem . . . is that medical people tend to see all difficulties solely 
from the perspective of proposed treatments for a ‗patient,‘ without recognizing that the 
individual has to weigh up whether this treatment fits into the overall economy of their 
life.‖  Id. (quoting Brisenden, 1986, p. 176).  
 312. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 24, at 26.  
 313. Since the impairments that befall human beings are the same everywhere, 
PERJU FORMATTED  5/16/20115/16/11  1:58 PM10:37 AM 
2011 Impairment, Discrimination, and the Legal Construction 163 
If, for instance, the fixation of the spine is at 30 degrees or more from the 
natural position, then that person is entitled to cash benefits.314  This 
medicalized approach has a deep-going social effect because it offers non-
disabled social actors a lens for de-coding situations in ways that legitimize 
asymmetries of social roles.  Paternalism, a staple feature of the charity 
model and medical approaches, takes root in these social asymmetries that 
become taken-for-granted fixtures of the social landscape.315  
Underlying the primacy of medical expertise is a certain ideal of 
normality as regularity.  The task of the doctor is to ―restore the disabled 
person to normality, whatever that means.‖316 A ―normal‖ life, in this view, 
is the kind of life that any rational person would want to live.  Conversely, 
no one who is rational could want to live with a medical impairment.  The 
medical expert is therefore available to help the individual become the way 
any rational person wants to be.  
Because the social model took issue both with claims of medical 
expertise and ―normality,‖317 its task became to delink illness from 
disability.  The decision not to theorize about medical impairments as part 
of the social model was perceived as an integral part of fulfilling that task.  
While medical impairments are different from illness, theorizing about 
impairments would, in the view of social model theorists, reinforce the 
misunderstanding that ―disability is ‗really‘ about physical limitation after 
all.‖ 318  Failure to theorize about impairments as part of the social model 
 
classification of impairments can transcend national borders and secure the convergence 
of technical terms.  In the influential 1980 classification of the World Health 
Organization, medical expertise becomes the unlikely site of residual cosmopolitanism.  
It is not surprising that, despite arguments in favor of dispensing with classifications 
altogether, the 1980 WHO rules were instead modified in the 2001 International 
Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF).  This is a typical situation of a 
conflict of rationalities between, on the one hand, the medical experts who relied on 
classifications to structure their understanding and reporting of disease and, on the other 
hand, disability rights advocates.  See generally Rachel Hurst, Disabled Peoples‟ 
International: Europe and the social model of disability, in THE SOCIAL MODEL OF 
DISABILITY: EUROPE AND THE MAJORITY WORLD 67–70 (Colin Barnes & Geof Mercer 
eds., 2005).  
 314. But see JERRY MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY CLAIMS 52–54 (1985) (noting that although Congress attempted to separate 
disability from unemployment, this binary classification is not in fact so absolute; the 
statute also makes the claimant‘s age, education, and work experience independently 
significant).  
 315. See Williams, supra note 10, at 520 (arguing that, for some people with 
disabilities, ―the benevolence of welfare institutions can appear more deadly than the 
harsh conditions often encountered in the outside world.‖).  On paternalism, see also 
Hahn, supra note 178, at 181–182.  
 316. OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 11, at 36 (―The whole medical and 
rehabilitation enterprise is founded upon an ideology of normality and this has far 
reaching implications for rehabilitation and treatment.  Its aim is to restore the disabled 
person to normality, whatever that may mean.‖).  
 317. See id. at 36–37 (describing the implications of the ideology of normality as 
resulting in the justification of surgical intervention and physical rehabilitation, whatever 
its costs in terms of pain and suffering of persons with disabilities). 
 318. See id. at 39 (quoting T. Shakespeare, A Response to Liz Crow, COALITION, 
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left a blind spot in the claims of the different disability rights movements.  
Yet even when such theorizing did occur as part of a social theory of 
disability, acknowledging Abberley‘s point that ―a theory of disability . . . 
then must offer what is essentially a social theory of impairment,‖319 those 
theories were of limited use to political and legal claims.  The theories were 
almost exclusively dedicated to the cultural production of impairment and 
disability.320  Culture was understood as the culture of groups, by contrast to 
the culture of individualism.321  The subjective experience of disability was 
the only standpoint from which the social problem of disability could be 
legitimately approached: ―A social theory of disability, however, must be 
located within the experience of disabled people themselves and their 
attempts, not only to redefine disability but also to construct a political 
movement amongst themselves and to develop services commensurate with 
their own self-defined needs.‖322  
The problem with this cultural theorizing about impairments is that, 
even assuming its soundness on the merits,323 it fails to distinguish 
impairment from illness.  Much of what it says about the cultural production 
of disability and impairments could be said about the cultural production of 
illness.  This is a problem because distinguishing between impairment and 
illness was the task it set out to accomplish.  Another problem with this 
approach is its reluctance to place itself in a cultural context.  The need to 
disconnect impairment from illness should itself be understood in a cultural 
context that shapes self-understanding, public policies, and legal rules.  
Culturally speaking, the rise of the social model was closely related to 
advancement in medical technologies that allowed individuals to live longer 
lives despite illnesses or impairments.324  Similar changes in medical and 
non-medical technologies have changed what it means and what it takes for 
an individual to be a dependent.325  Moreover, in a legal context, awareness 
of cultural context might lead one to ask if, for instance, the asymmetries 
noted in the medical model can be counter-balanced in a legal system that 
recognizes a constitutional right to health.326  These elements of cultural 
 
1992). 
 319. OLIVER, POLITICS, supra note 311, at 12.  
 320. See OLIVER, POLITICS, supra note 311, at 12–14. 
 321. See id. at 11 (discussing ―the ways in which disability is ‗produced‘ as an 
individual and medical problem within capitalist society.‖). 
 322. Id.  
 323. See Colin Barnes & Geof Mercer, Understanding Impairment and Disability: 
Towards an International Perspective, in THE SOCIAL MODEL OF DISABILITY: EUROPE 
AND THE MAJORITY WORLD 5–6 (Colin Barnes & Geof Mercer eds., 2005).  
 324. See Scotch, Social Movement, supra note 15, at 164 (discussing how ―physical 
impairment [became] less handicapping than the barriers of stereotyped attitudes and 
architectural constraints.‖).   
 325. Monique Gignac & Cheryl Cott, A Conceptual Model of Independence and 
Dependence for Adults with Chronic Physical Illness and Disability, 47 SOC. SCI. MED 
739, 748–49 (1998).  
 326. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 27(1)(a) (―Everyone has the right to have 
access to health care services, including reproductive health care.‖).   
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contextualization were often disregarded by theorizing about medical 
impairments in the context of a social theory of disability.  
However sound the need to delink medical impairment from illness, 
social movements were bereft of arguments to invoke in the public sphere—
and notably, in courts of law—regarding the interpretation of impairment in 
the definition of disability from the perspective of the social model.  
Moreover, as I will show in the next section, the disability rights movement 
lacked the incentive to correct for this missing account of medical 
impairments.  Yet the concept of medical impairment continued to figure 
prominently in the definitions of disability, which included chronic health 
problems such as high blood pressure or diabetes.327  In the next section, I 
show how the lack of guidance on how to interpret the concept of medical 
impairment led courts—both in the United States and in Europe – toward a 
medicalized approach as a way of quieting their institutional misgivings 
about possible abuses of disability statutes.  
B. The Disability Rights Movement and the Role of the Judiciary 
Let us now take a closer look at the antidiscrimination model and the 
significance of enforceable rights as the framework in which the struggle for 
recognition of persons with disability was cast both in the United States and 
the European Union (as well as gradually in the national politics of the 
Member States).  Rights— enforceable rights—played a key role in the 
transformation of disability policy.  In this process, the U.S. acted as ―an 
exporter of rights consciousness.‖328  From the late 1960s through the 
1990s, the American antidiscrimination regime framed the horizon of the 
legal imagination of disability advocates from across Europe.  But the 
importance of rights transcended their strategic use.  The idea of enforceable 
rights was also deeply embedded in the normative assumptions of the social 
model.  The medicalized approach had failed ―to take into account wider 
aspects of disability,‖329 such as the experiences of disabled persons.  An 
emphasis on rights changes the social status and social understanding of 
persons with disabilities from powerless recipients of their peers‘ charity to 
right-holders capable of making demands on the world.330  
Antidiscrimination rights are granted to individuals as a means to 
defend them from society‘s discriminatory reaction to real or perceived, 
present or past medical impairments.  In the eyes of the law, as well as from 
the perspective of the social movement, right-holders belong to a special 
protected class of persons with disabilities.  However, having a right might 
 
 327. See data from the US Census Bureau, cited in Weisbach, supra note 17, at 60.  
 328. Heyer, supra note 31, at 756. 
 329. OLIVER, POLITICS, supra note 311, at 5.  
 330. See Scotch, Models, supra note 3, at 216 (―Rights empower people with 
disabilities. With rights, people with disabilities may legitimately contest what they 
perceive to be illegitimate treatment of them.‖ (quoting PAUL C. HIGGINS, MAKING 
DISABILITY: EXPLORING THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN VARIATION 199–200 
(1992)).   
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be insufficient for the individuals to see themselves as belonging to the 
protected group.  This gap between self-understanding, on the one hand, and 
the status of belonging to a certain social category, on the other hand, is 
particularly significant in the case of persons with disabilities because of the 
wide array of medical impairments that triggers social discrimination.331  
Yet social reform depends on effective political advocacy that itself turns on 
the shared consciousness of participants in the social movement.  Unlike 
with other social groups that struggled for recognition, where such 
commonality—on grounds of race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.—could 
be more or less taken for granted, the formation of a shared consciousness 
of persons with disabilities required that the protected class be carefully 
delineated.  From this perspective, linking impairments and illness would 
expand the ambits of the protected class, dilute the shared political identity 
of the class members, and delay, perhaps sine die, political emancipation.  
From the perspective of the social movements, allowing persons who are ill 
to receive disability protection would undermine the conditions for the 
development of a collective consciousness that could support effective 
political action.  This idea of a special class, a group, was central to the 
architecture of the social model.332  From within that model, the transition 
from the medical to the social approach brought with it a shift from an 
individual approach to a group perspective.  At the very core of the social 
model, at least in its early formulations, was the need for a ―process of 
empowerment of disabled people as a group‖ by contrast to the 
individualized assessment of the medicalized approach.333  Implied in this 
shift is the acceptance of a binary approach to disability (including a 
categorical conception of dependence/independence334), and conversely, a 
rejection of the view that it is best to conceptualize disability along a 
continuum.335  It is thus apparent how this political strategy shaped the core 
claims of the social model, particularly the lack of theorizing about medical 
impairments.  From this perspective, the ECJ‘s refusal to extend the 
Directive‘s protection to cover Navas‘s illness was correct.  The social 
 
 331. See Scotch, Social Movement, supra note 15, at 163 (―‗disability‘ as a unifying 
concept that includes people with a wide range of physical and mental impairments is by 
no means an obvious category.  Blind people, people with orthopedic impairments, and 
people with epilepsy may not inherently see themselves or be seen by others as 
occupying common ground.  Even greater divisions may exist between individuals with 
physical impairments and those with mental disabilities.  Thus another prerequisite for 
collective action may be the social construction and promulgation of an inclusive 
definition of disability.‖). 
 332. As always in these situations, there is a risk of essentializing the traits that 
delimit the protected class.  See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON 
OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 191 (2006) (―the liberty paradigm [protects] the authentic self better 
than the equality paradigm. While it need not do so, the equality paradigm is prone to 
essentializing the identities it protects.‖). 
 333. OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 11, at 37.  
 334. For a critique, see Gignac & Cott, supra note 325. 
 335. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 10, at 522.  On the subordination approach, as 
contrasted with competing alternatives, see Bagenstos, Subordination, supra note 65, at 
445–84.  
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model provides counter-arguments to the position of the Madrid Labor 
Court, the referring court in Navas, to the effect that ―a worker should . . . 
be protected as soon as the sickness is established.‖336 
The concerns of the judiciary are different from the formation of shared 
identity of persons with disabilities.  Courts see themselves as entrusted 
with the interpretation and application of statutes in a clear, rational, and 
administrable fashion.  I will refer to these as the judiciary‘s institutional 
self-understanding.  If adjudication is understood as line-drawing and line-
policing, then the question of preventing abuse becomes a central 
concern.337 Courts cannot fulfill their institutional task without filtering out 
abusive claims.  In order to do this, judges must draw and enforce the 
boundaries of the group of persons to whom the law grants special 
entitlements.  How they draw those boundaries will have an impact on the 
formation of political consciousness, yet that impact is not likely to be a 
concern of the judiciary.  The stakes in the definition of disability are a 
function of its far-reaching implications for both courts and the social 
movement, albeit for different reasons.338  Because of these high stakes, the 
definition of disability has become the battleground of different 
approaches.339  
These institutional concerns explain why courts interpreted the concept 
of impairments according to a medicalized approach, while at the same time 
refusing to extend disability protection to any person who was discriminated 
against because of illness.  Consider for now this second issue.  Although 
the determination of this issue arose differently in the ECJ as compared to 
the American courts, with the ECJ stipulating a definition in Navas and 
American courts interpreting the statutory definition of disability, American 
law takes a similar position as that of the Navas court.  That is, American 
courts declined to protect discrimination based on illness under the 
 
 336. See Opinion of Advoc. Gen., Navas, ¶ 27.  But see European Disability Forum, 
EDF Analysis, supra note 164, at 8 (arguing that the difference between disability and 
illness is quantitative, and that any illness that has long-term effects (such as heart 
disease, diabetes, asthma, depression) constitutes a disability). 
 337. For an attempt to deconstruct the layers of argument about social structure in 
antidiscrimination law, see generally Elisabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2009).  
 338. Harlan Hahn has criticized courts for their failure to adopt a minority group 
model of disability based on the social model.  See Hahn, supra note 178, at 176 (―The 
sociopolitical definition [of disability] is the foundation of the minority group model of 
disability, which contends that disabled Americans are entitled to the same legal and 
constitutional protection as other disadvantaged groups.‖).  Hahn has developed the 
minority group model in Harlan Hahn, The Minority Group Model of Disability: 
Implications for Medical Sociology, in RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTHCARE 3–
24 (Rose Welt & Jeanne J. Kronenfield eds., 1994).  As I argue in this section, I do not 
believe that Hahn is right in arguing that courts have failed to adopt a minority group 
model.  In fact, the court‘s turn back to a narrow definition of disability has arisen 
precisely because judges operated within that framework.   
 339. See, e.g., Scotch, Social Movement, supra note 15;  see also BAGENSTOS, supra 
note 24, at 45 (―Passing judgment on the Supreme Court‘s definition-of-disability 
decisions . . . entails passing judgment on the strategies and ideals of disability 
movement activists themselves.‖).  
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disability heading.  For instance, in Christian v. St. Anthony Medical 
Center, Inc., the plaintiff argued that the ADA protects an employee from 
being fired because of an illness.340  The court held, unequivocally, that it 
does not.341 Likewise, in Rodriguez v. Loctite Puerto Rico, Inc., judges 
found as a matter of law that the plaintiff – who allegedly suffered from 
Lupus – was not disabled under the ADA because the illness did not limit 
any of her major life functions.342  The court explained, ―An illness cannot 
in and of itself be considered an impairment. Only its symptoms and/or 
ramifications actually limit the inflicted person‘s ability to perform major 
life activities.‖343 
Institutional concerns are so deeply embedded in their legal rationality 
that they regularly surface in judicial decisions. When the ECJ in Navas 
stated that ―[t]here is nothing in Directive 2000/78 to suggest that workers 
are protected by the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability as 
soon as they develop any type of sickness,‖344 what it indicates is its fear 
that plaintiffs with trivial and transitory conditions will abuse the Directive.  
In the Sutton context, fears of abuse were compounded by the factual 
context of the case, which referred to a very common medical condition of 
suboptimal vision.345  Commentators have pointed out that the facts in this 
case were less than ideal as a vehicle for getting a statement of principle on 
the first prong of the definition of disability.  Other legal systems, for 
instance the UK‘s, have excluded eyeglasses or contact lenses, understood 
as corrective measures for suboptimal vision, from disability protection.346 
One can therefore see how this very common measure—correcting 
suboptimal vision might have initially obscured the far-reaching 
implications of denying ADA protection to individuals that applied 
corrective measures to their impairments. 
Administrability is also a part of courts‘ concerns with dispensing their 
 
 340. See Christian, 117 F.3d 1051, 1052–53 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 341. See id. at 1053 (―The Act is not a general protection of medically afflicted 
persons . . . [i]f the employer discriminates against them on account of their being (or 
being believed by him to be) ill, even permanently ill, but not disabled, there is no 
violation.‖); see also Bridges, 92 F.3d 329  (affirming judgment for employer where 
plaintiff was disqualified from being a firefighter based on his hemophilia because 
hemophilia is not a disability per se and the field of firefighting jobs was so narrow that 
plaintiff was not substantially limited in the major life activity of working).  For a 
discussion of the tort-based public policy exception to the at-will doctrine available 
under state law to employees fired for absenteeism due to temporary total disability, see 
Seth Hanft, Creating a Public Policy Exception for Absenteeism Due to Temporary Total 
Disability: Common Law or Codification?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 655 (2008). 
 342. 967 F. Supp. 653, 659 (D. Puerto Rico, 1997). 
 343. Id. 
 344. Chacon Navas, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467, ¶ 46 (emphasis added). 
 345. 527 U.S. at 475.  To be fair, the severe myopia only affected 2% of the 
population.  See id. at 507 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
 346. See COLKER, supra note 79, at 105 (citing Nick Wenbourne, Disabled 
Meanings: A Comparison of the Definition of „Disability‟ in the British Disability 
Discrimination Act of 1995 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 23 
HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP L REV. 149 (1999)). 
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institutional task.  The dissenters in Sutton noted the majority‘s concern 
with ―the tidal waves of lawsuits‖347 that presumably would have followed 
from authorizing plaintiffs to bring claims despite the alleviating effects of 
measures that mitigate their impairment.  These are familiar institutional 
concerns with the administrability of judicially-produced standards.  This 
administrability is connected to the idea of formal equality, that all cases 
must be treated alike.  
There was little to answer courts‘ institutional concerns that a social 
model, effect-based interpretation of disability would not make it impossible 
to identify and weed out abusive claims.  With no other anchors within 
reach (societal attitudes or health condition, illness, etc), judges relied on the 
concept of medical impairment, understood in a narrow, medicalized way, 
in drawing the boundaries of the class of persons to whom disability statutes 
apply.  Developing a theoretical account of medical impairments would 
have been a sine qua non condition for operationalizing the social model for 
the use of courts.  The tension between the judiciary‘s concerns and the 
aims of the disability movement provides the additional explanation that 
none of the factors discussed above—doctrine, interpretation, the 
jurisprudence of equality, sociology of the legal professions, institutional 
structure, or ideology—could capture satisfactorily. 
The explanation proposed above does not seek to justify courts‘ 
approaches to the definition of disability.  Put differently, the reaction of 
courts is understandable, but not—or not necessarily348—justified.  The 
question of justification depends on one‘s conception of the institutional 
role of courts.  Consider for instance the asymmetry in the social roles of 
judges and disability advocates.  One can start from observing this 
asymmetry and construct a view of the judiciary‘s role whereby judges 
should anticipate and remedy the self-inflicted distortions of the kind that 
have led the disability rights movement to specific legal constructions of 
disability.349  Leaving medical impairments under-theorized was such a 
distortion effect that occurred in the process of translating the insights of the 
social model into public policy and legal claims.  If one believes that courts 
are under a duty of responsiveness, then the narrow, medicalized definition 
of disability represents a failure of responsiveness on the part of courts.  
This approach has important implications de lege ferenda.  At least at a 
formal level, the lessons would be easier to implement in the EU where the 
path dependency in the definition of disability is less severe than in the US.  
 
 347. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 508 (Stevens J., dissenting). 
 348. Some disability law scholars have forcefully argued against attempts to separate 
description from justification.  See Martha T. McCluskey, How the Biological/Social 
Divide Limits Disability and Equality, 33 WASH. U. J. L. & POL‘Y 109, 112 (2010) (―In 
the case of disability, as with gender, the positivist inquiry into what the relevant 
difference is cannot be separated from the normative inquiry into what the relevant 
difference should be.‖).  
 349. Constructing such an institutional account of the role of courts goes beyond the 
aim of this paper.  I have sketched out such an approach in Vlad Perju, Cosmopolitanism 
and Constitutional Self-Government, 8 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 326 (2010). 
PERJU FORMATTED 5/16/20115/16/11  1:58 PM10:37 AM 
170 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 44 
For instance, proposals for a new Equal Treatment Directive mention the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities as ―guidance‖ in 
defining the concept of disability.  In the US, the 2008 ADAAA represents 
Congress‘ wish to restore the initial aims of the ADA, but leaves the 
definition of disability intact and fails to give courts definitive guidance on 
how to interpret the concept of medical impairments.350  One effect will be 
that ADA litigation will be channeled toward the ―regarded as‖ prong in the 
hope of steering away from definitional disputes.  While many anticipate 
that this is the likely development in the foreseeable future, institutional 
concerns with administrability will sooner or later lead judges to seek 
objective grounds for their decisions and thus revert back to the definitional 
analysis.  
Another option, in both the EU and the US, would be to do away with a 
reference to medical impairments in the definitions of disability.  Yet it is 
unlikely that such a proposal would be realistically accepted.  There is a 
path dependency in how concepts are defined, and medical impairments 
have been so much at the center of the meaning of disability that it might be 
difficult to radically shift course at this stage.  A more moderate proposal 
would encapsulate the lessons of the past and have greater chances for 
success.  Specifically, the new approach would define disability as the 
social effect of real or perceived medical impairments.  Such a definition 
would shift judicial analysis away from the nature of the medical 
impairments and towards the discriminatory social effects.  This may not be 
the guidance that judges needed all along, but it would be a step in the right 
direction. 
Conclusion 
Proposals for future reforms in disability law reform depend on first 
facing the legacy of the past.  This Article has cast that legacy in a different 
light.  Using a comparative framework, I have argued that distortion effects 
in the formulation of claims rooted in the social model are a previously 
overlooked factor that explains in part the resilience of the medicalized 
model in judicial definitions of disability.  I have made this argument by 
first identifying a synchronized evolution of disability law in Europe and the 
United States.  This synchronization was the effect of the social model of 
disability on the legal and political cultures of both jurisdictions, as well as 
of the cross-influence of disability rights movements.  One aspect of the 
synchronization is the presence of narrow judicial interpretations of 
disability in both the EU and the U.S.  These interpretations drastically 
limited the class of intended beneficiaries of legislation aimed at 
implementing a discrimination based approach to disability.  While 
American scholarship has investigated at great length the decisions of U.S. 
 
 350. For an example of recent case where courts operated the interpretative shift 
dictated by Congress in the ADAAA, see Gil v. Vortex, LLC, 697 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. 
Mass.2010). 
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courts, scholars have rarely looked across the Atlantic in order to gain a new 
perspective on the state of affairs in American disability law.  I argued that 
the social model itself must be included—alongside ideology, text, doctrine, 
institutional structure, or professional consciousness—in the explanation of 
the judiciary‘s narrow interpretations.  Specifically, I have examined the 
interplay between, on the one hand, the social model‘s conceptualization of 
illness, impairment, and disability, and on the other hand, the broader 
argumentative strategies that the disability rights movement deployed in its 
struggle for recognition of the equal status of persons with disabilities.  The 
confluence of these two factors explains the failure to conceptualize medical 
impairments, to which I referred as a distortion effect in the translation of 
the insights of the social model into public policy and legal claims.  Thus, 
the decision to leave medical impairments under-theorized was the response 
of social model theorists to the perceived risk that an analogy between 
impairments and illness would legitimize the dominion of medical expertise, 
and that it would perpetuate socially disabling assumptions about normality.  
These distortion effects left courts bereft of guidance on the social model 
interpretation of disability and made them seek refuge in the more familiar 
territory of the medicalized approach.  Narrow judicial interpretations of 
disability are the answer to how judges, consumed by institutional concerns 
with the administrability of potentially sweeping disability statutes, reacted 
to the fears of social movements that only a strong social discrimination 
approach could create the shared political consciousness necessary for 
reform.  I offered this answer as an explanation, not a justification, of the 
work of courts in both the EU and the US.  This broad, comparative 
approach puts the struggle for recognition of persons with disabilities in a 
new light.   
